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Mobilization represents an instrument of significant
importance in U.S. strategic policy. Inherent in the mobi-
lization process and a viable, secure mobilization base is
the capacity for maximizing potential national strength to
achieve essential national security goals. The relative de-
cline of U.S. international influence, the current condition
of superpower nuclear parity and U.S. conventional inferi-
ority to the Soviet Union, and the increasing potential for
the occurrence of protracted warfare at various levels of
conflict have increased the importance of maintaining a
credible mobilization capability. The current U.S. deter-
rent posture and warfighting capability and the viability of
its mobilization base are weakened, however, by U.S. vul-
nerability to disruptions of supplies of strategic and
critical minerals from foreign sources, the degraded condi-
tion of the American defense industrial base, and the lack
of both an effective, centralized national mobilization au-
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I. INTRODUCTION
The review of American defense policy may be convenient-
ly divided into two distinct phases. The first, lasting
from the period of the Revolutionary War until 1945, was
dominated by a mobilization strategy. During this phase,
the British Navy's control of the high seas and the geo-
graphical separation of the United States from the world
powers of the day provided the basis for American national
security. These factors reduced the fear of invasion by
foreign powers, allowing the United States to maintain only
a small standing army, and constituted a buffer, providing
ample time for the expansion of the nation's armed forces
when war was imminent. The introduction of more modern
technical and mechanical instruments of war (e.g., weapons,
munitions, transportation, and communications of more ad-
vanced types) during the later stages of this first phase
— from the late 1800s through World War II--tended to reduce
the advantages of geographical separation and increase the
importance of maintaining sufficient industrial capability




Ken Booth, "The Evolution of Strategic Thinking," in
Contemporary Strategy: Theories and Policies , John Baylis




The second phase of American defense policy, occurring
from roughly 1946 to the present, has been characterized by
a strategy of deterrence. With the introduction of weapons
of mass destruction, sophisticated intelligence systems, and
the means for rapid communications and transportation, em-
phasis has shifted from the maintenance of capabilities for
the expansion of military strength in times of national
emergency to the maintenance of substantial strategic and
conventional forces-in-being. Central to this alteration in
national security posture has been the belief that modern
war may occur without warning, that it will be fought with
nuclear weapons, and that the use of such weapons will re-
sult in wars of short duration and high destructive poten-
tial. Within the context of this environment, the goal of
deterrence strategy has been the prevention of war. Should
war occur, however, the advantages of geographic location
would be nullified, and insufficient time would be available
for the mobilization of national resources, resulting in the
2
reguirement to wage the war with existing means.
Recent scholars have suggested, however, the possible
emergence, in the present, of an additional third phase in
American defense policy, wherein mobilization has reassumed
a role of importance. They contend that the escalation of
David W. Tarr, "American Strategic Thought," m Nation -
al Security Affairs: Theoretical Perspectives and Contempo -
rary Issue s, eds . 3. Thomas Trout and James E. Harf (New
Brunswick, NJ: Transaction Books, 1982), pp. 82-93.
11

conflict to the nuclear level is contraindicated by the
occurrence of numerous limited, conventional conflicts since
•World War II, and by the potential capability for limiting
superpower rivalry through conflict resolution and conflict
management. They further contend that the continuing poten-
tial for conventional conflict has created a condition in
which, even if conflict should escalate to the use of nucle-
ar weapons, "mobilization to enhance our capabilities for
response and deterrence is not only relevant but . . . vital
and urgent." Additionally, supporting the requirement for
a credible U.S. mobilization capability are the increased
potential for prolonged war, recognized in Presidential Di-
rective 59 (PD-59); the current Soviet mobilization effort,
evidenced by increased Soviet defense expenditures, the ex-
pansion of military manpower levels, and the increased pro-
duction of war materiel; the diplomatic leverage and freedom
of action with conventional arms realized by the Soviet
Union following the achievement of nuclear parity with the
3 . . ...Richard B. Foster and Francis P. Hoeber, "Limited Mobi-
lization: A Strategy for Preparedness and Deterrence in the
Eighties," Orbis 24 (Fall 1980) : 441-442 . Additional exam-
ples of this emerging school of strategic thought are pro-
vided by Jacques S. Gansler, The Defense Industry (Cam-
bridge, Ma.: MIT Press, 1982), p. 110; Gordon A. Craig and
Alexander L. George, Force and Statecraft: Diplomatic Prob -
lems of Our Time (New York: Oxford University Press, 1983);
Colin S. Gray, "Mobilization for High-Level Conflict: Poli-
cy Issues," in The U.S. Defense Mobilization Infrastructure:
Problems and Priorities , eds. Robert L. Pfaltzgraff, Jr.,
and Uri Ra ' anan (Hamden, Ct . : Archon Books, 1983), pp. 33-
49; and Arthur A. Stein, The Nation at War (Baltimore: Johns
Hopkins University Press, 1980), pp. 98-100.
12

United States; and, finally, concern over the readiness of
4conventional American forces.
During this century, the United States has participated
in two major regional conflicts—the Korean and Vietnam
Wars—and in two world wars. Of these four wars, only the
Vietnam War was undertaken on the basis of "business as usu-
al," a politically expedient approach developed and adopted
in the face of domestic and international opinion, American
misperceptions of the challenge, and miscalculations by the
. . . . 5U.S. or its capabilities and those of its opponent. The
remaining three wars reguired extraordinary efforts by the
government, U.S. industry, and the American people to pro-
vide the means necessary to successfully prosecute the wars
and prevent the United States and its allies from yielding
to the aggression of their enemies. National disaster— in
both the political and military senses—was avoided, in each
instance, not by the pre-existence of a strong military
structure, but rather, through the maintenance of a viable
capability to mobilize the factors of national potential.
This study will attempt to identify these factors of
national potential and demonstrate the relationship between
4Foster and Hoeber, pp. 442-447.
Bernard Brodie, War and Politics (New York: Macmillan
Publishing Co., 1973), pp. 115-144.
D Stein, pp. 87-100.
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them and mobilization, and between mobilization and United
States strategic policy. In pursuit of this purpose, analy-




The predominant domestic and international conditions
influencing the realization of full national potential;
2. The concepts of threat and conflict in the interna-
tional arena, and the utility of mobilization in reducing
the vulnerability of the nation to the employment of threats;
and,
3. The current mobilization potential of the United
States and major problem areas now existing.
14

II. THE DOMESTIC CONTEXT
The United States is today faced with an array of domes-
tic and international conditions whose complexity, serious-
ness, and potential for adverse consequences far exceed
those encountered at any earlier time in the nation's his-
tory. These conditions do not act in isolation. Instead,
operating independently and in combination, they influence
the actions of the government, in general, and the formula-
tion, implementation, and execution of current foreign and
domestic policies, in particular. The policies and actions
of the government, in turn, influence the prevailing condi-
tions. The functional requirements of government operations*,
then, produce a cyclical pattern of problem identification,
policy development and implementation, and policy assessment
and refinement. Because internal and external conditions
influece, and are influenced by, government activities in a
dynamic fashion, an operational imperative emerges in the
form of a requirement for the government to continuously
monitor changing domestic and international conditions.
Ideally, such monitoring should provide the government with
the capability, first, to correctly assess the impact and
effectiveness of its actions and current policies, and sec-
ond, to anticipate future policy requirements and develop




lack of information, misinterpretation of available informa-
tion, and miscalculations may prohibit the achievement of
unbiased assessments and may obstruct the development of
realistic plans for the future.
Within the domestic context, four conditions are of pri-
mary interest as motivating, actualizing, or constraining
influences on domestic, foreign, and military policies, and
on the realization of full national potential. These in-
clude the American "strategic culture," the "post-Vietnam




The first domestic condition to be considered as an in-
fluence on government activity is the strategic culture of
the United States. Perhaps the strongest and the most en-
during and complex of the domestic influences, the concept of
the national strategic culture is an aggregation of the na-
tional character, derived from and reflecting the ethnic and
cultural backgrounds of the people and their shared histori-
cal experiences; the nation's political culture; its geo-
strategic position; the abundance and accessibility of its
natural resources; its industrial strength and economic vi-
tality; and the collective perceptions of the people and
their leaders concerning the structure and nature of the in-
ternational environment and the legitimate role of the nation
16

in that environment. Taken as a whole, these tangible and
intangible factors constitute a filtering mechanism, provid-
ing both a body of inherent guidance for the functioning of
the government and a vehicle for measuring the legitimacy of
government actions and policies. In the former capacity,
through legal statutes, tradition, custom, and perceptions
of public will, the strategic culture defines the limits of
necessary, reasonable, and allowable activities for the na-
tional leaders. It provides the framework within which na-
tional level decisions are made, and it structures the na-
ture of interactions with other sovereign nations in the in-
ternational arena. In the latter capacity, the strategic
culture is manifested in general public opinion and exists
as a potentially significant conditioning influence on the
development, implementation, and execution of government
policy. During the problem identification phase of the poli-
cy cycle, the strategic culture aids in establishing percep-
tions of those conditions representing threats to the nation
and in determining the initial alternative responses that
will be considered. In the policy formulation phase, poli-
cymakers are further influenced by perceptions of the
threats and by the limitations imposed on possible policy
options by the perceived public acceptability of the alter-
natives and the anticipated public response. Public opinion
may again dominate the process during the implementation and
assessment phases should the selected policy alternative not
17

meet with the acceptance of the general public. In in-
stances where the legitimacy of the adopted policy is ques-
tioned and a strongly negative public response results,
policymakers may be forced to revaluate the situation, recon-
sider available alternatives, and, possibly, modify the ex-
isting policy--if this can be accomplished without unduly
jeopardizing the interests and security of the nation.
The degree to which considerations of the national
strategic culture enter, either consciously or unconsciously,
into government decisions and activities is problematical.
Being composed of elements of both moralism and pragmatism,
and encompassing not only the way the nation views itself
and other nations, but also how it desires to be viewed by
others, the concept of the strategic culture is somewhat
amorphous. As such, it may best be demonstrated through its
practical expression in historical cases.
An excellent example of the influence of the strate-
gic culture in its guidance role is provided by the Cuban
Missile Crisis of October 1962, and the response of President
John F. Kennedy and the Executive Committee of the National
Security Council (Ex Comm) to the attempted introduction of
nuclear ballistic missiles into Cuba by the Soviet Union.
Faced with incontrovertible evidence of the missiles 1 exist-
ence in Cuba, the initial reaction was that some form of
action by the United States was required. Debate within the
Ex Comm regarding an appropriate response narrowed the

available options to the consideration of a military attack
against the missile sites or a naval quarantine or blockade
of Cuba. In the end, President Kennedy chose to institute a
blockade. Contributing to this decision were three primary
factors: (1) the relatively limited provocativeness of and
the greater flexibility of action provided by a naval block-
ade as compared with a military attack; (2) the probable re-
quirement within the military attack option to conduct an
invasion of Cuba to destroy the missile sites, in as much as
their destruction by "surgical air strikes" could not be
guaranteed; and (3) the potential for the escalation of the
crisis into a nuclear exchange between the Soviet Union and
the United States as a consequence of U.S. military action
directed against Cuba.
On the surface, President Kennedy's decision appears
to have resulted from the pragmatic consideration of Ameri-
can goals, resources and capabilities, and a careful exami-
nation of the potential costs and benefits of the two princi-
pal alternatives. Writing about the events that transpired
during the thirteen days of the crisis, however, Robert F.
Kennedy, then-Attorney General and a participant in the ac-
tivities of the Ex Comm, presents an additional significant
7Robert F. Kennedy, Thirteen Days: A Memoir of the
:uban Missile Crisis , with Introductions by Robert S. McNa-
mara and Harold Macmillan (New York: W. W. Norton & Co.,
1969), pp. 31-34. See also, Graham T. Allison, Essence of
Decision: Explaining the Cuban Missile Crisis (Boston:
Little, Brown & Co., 1971), pp. 58-62.
19

factor in the debate. In discussing the various aspects
considered in arriving at the final decision, he demon-
strates the key role played by the decisionmakers' percep-
tions of the American strategic culture, noting that
. . . whatever validity the military and political
arguments were for an attack in preference to a block-
ade, America's traditions and history would not permit
such a course of action. Whatever military reasons
[Dean Acheson] and others could marshal, they were
nevertheless, in the last analysis, advocating a sur-
prise attack by a very large nation against a very
small one. This . . . could not be undertaken by the
U.S. if we were to maintain our moral position at home
and around the globe. Our struggle against Communism
throughout the world was far more than physical sur-
vival— it had as its essence our heritage and our
ideals, and these we must not destroy.
We spent more time on this moral guestion during
the first five days than on any other single matter.
. . . We struggled and fought with one another and
with our consciences, for it was a guestion that
deeply troubled us all.
This example reflects the character of the strategic
culture as a restraint on the freedom of action of decision-
makers. It may also exhibit a motivational role, providing
either positive or negative motivation, or a combination of
both. As a positive motivator, it directs action toward
the attainment of a goal, as was the case with the perceived
9
imperative "... that some form of action was required" to
counter the Soviet ploy in Cuba. Alternately, as a negative
motivator, the desired response is solicited by establishing
Ibid
. , pp . 38-39
9 Ibid




perceptions of the unacceptable consequences associated with
a failure to respond properly, as was demonstrated by Presi-
dent Kennedy's comment, during the waning hours of the cri-
sis, to the effect that, having perceived that decisive ac-
tion was necessary to check the Soviets, had it not been
undertaken, "'I would have been impeached.'"
Numerous examples exist illustrating the function of
the national strategic culture as a measure of legitimacy in
examining government activities. The above statement by
Robert F. Kennedy reflects one facet of this role, as re-
lates to its influence in determining the limits of allowa-
ble actions for decisionmakers when they are isolated from
the direct pressures of public opinion. It may also be
seen, however, in expressions of public sentiment relating
to government activities and policies. This expression may,
at one extreme, be as general and benign as the demonstra-
tion of concurrence witnessed in the reelection of a govern-
ment official, or, conversely, the voting out of office of
an official whose activities or policies are suspect. At
the opposite extreme, public pressure may cause the initia-
tion of reforms or otherwise result in an alteration of
Ibid
. , p. 67
A policy of strict secrecy was imposed on information
concerning the events leading up to President Kennedy's pub-
lic announcement of the naval blockade on day seven (Octo-
ber 22) of the Cuban Missile Crisis. Thus, the effect of





existing government policies and activities. For example,
during the 1970s, U.S. intelligence agencies were subjected
to intense public scrutiny regarding their domestic and for-
eign activities. The intelligence collection methods (e.g.,
the interception of mail, wiretaps, and "break-ins") em-
ployed within the United States by both the Federal Bureau
of Investigation (FBI) and the Central Intelligence Agency
(CIA) were attacked as infringements on the constitutional
rights of American citizens. Additionally, the domestic ac-
tivities of the FBI in connection with its Counterintelli-
gence Program ( COINTELPRO) , designed to disrupt and discred-
it selected dissident groups, and certain covert CIA activi-
ties abroad (e.g., alleged assassination plots, alleged in-
volvement in plots to overthrow governments, and support of
repressive, undemocratic governments and movements) were
criticized as being contrary to basic American ideals. The
public indignation and furor generated during the ensuing
open debate regarding the intelligence community resulted in
a series of congressional and executive branch initiatives
designed to restrict and control intelligence activities.
These included, among others: (1) the issuance of Executive
Order 11905 by President Ford in February 1976, clarifying
the functions and roles of and the restrictions on the in-
telligence community; (2) the creation of the Senate and
House of Representatives Committees on Intelligence, tasked
with oversight responsibilities concerning covert actions;
22

(3) the issuance of Executive Order 12036 by President Ford
in January 1978, restating the community's roles, missions,
and restrictions, and providing the Attorney General with
the authority to recommend the disapproval of specific cov-
ert operations; and (4) the passage of the Foreign Intelli-
gence Surveillance Act of 1978, reguiring legal warrants in
order to conduct electronic surveillance on American citi-
zens, inside U.S. territory, for intelligence or counterin-
telligence purposes.
B. POST-VIETNAM SYNDROME
A second domestic condition influencing government
policy is the so-called "post-Vietnam syndrome." Some ten
years after the end of the Vietnam War, the United States is
still plagued by repercussions arising from that conflict.
Within the historical context of the Vietnam War and its
aftermath, the U.S. has experienced several fundamental, in-
terrelated structural and psychological alterations. First,
although public support for the war was never strong, as the
conflict lengthened and expanded in scope and intensity--par-
ticularly after direct, uncensored news media coverage of
the events in Southeast Asia became the norm following the
1968 Tet offensive--a ground swell of public opinion opposing
1 o
Amos A. Jordan and William J. Taylor, Jr., American
Jational Security: Policy and Process , with a Foreword by-
Maxwell D. Taylor (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University
Press, 1981), pp. 137-146.
23

U.S. military involvement emerged. Notwithstanding that
this pattern of initial public support, followed by dimin-
ishing support, and, finally, opposition, is an historical
13American phenomenon, public discontent with the Vietnam
War was exacerbated by the failure of U.S. arms, once in-
volved, to achieve a satisfactory military conclusion in the
conflict, and by the failure of American diplomacy to lend
credence to government rhetoric by securing a peace settle-
ment that was truly a "peace with honor." The humiliating
flight of American personnel from Saigon in April 1975, fol-
lowing the withdrawal of U.S. combat forces and the conguest
of South Vietnam by the North, served only to fuel the fires
of public discontent. The psychological impact of having
"lost" both the war and the peace has left its mark on the
American public, and has been reflected in a period of col-
lective self-doubt, a continuing debate concerning the es-
tablishment of national priorities, and an overriding hesi-
tancy to permit the involvement of U.S. military forces in
subsequent confrontational situations.
A second component of the post-Vietnam syndrome has
been the deterioration of public trust in the government and
the national leaders. Initially generated by unresolved
guestions dealing with the morality of the Vietnam War and
Charles W. Kegley, Jr. and Eugene R. Wittkopf, Ameri -
zan Foreign Policy: Pattern and Process (New York: St.
Martin's Press, 1982), p. 279.
24

the legitimacy of U.S. involvement, this degenerative condi-
tion was aggravated by the unfolding of the Watergate scan-
dal beginning in the summer of 1972. The subsequent revela-
tion of the details relating to the misuse of government au-
thority and the domestic and foreign activities of U.S. in-
telligence agencies, combined with the attendant public
humiliation and resignation of President Richard M. Nixon,
the first American president to resign from office, served
only to heighten the public's concern. The result has been
a general degradation of public faith in the national lead-
ership and a growing public tendency to question the validi-
ty of the declared national purpose and the form and direc-
tion of government initiatives—particularly those of the
executive department— in both the foreign and domestic poli-
cy arenas.
14Third, the involvement of the "attentive public"
in the policymaking process grew dramatically during and
following the Vietnam War. This phenomenon was initially
spurred by the rising tide of public discontent with the
war, and, later, by the increased influence of the mass
14 .Kegley and Wittkopf represent the American public as a
three-tiered pyramid. At the top are the "decision-making
elite," comprising approximately two percent of the popula-
tion. The middle layer, the "attentive public," includes
"those knowledgable in foreign affairs [and, by extension,
other areas] but not necessarily with access to decision
makers" and comprises between 15 and 20 percent of the popu-
lation. The bottom and largest layer, being the remainder




media in establishing the public agenda and shaping public
opinion, by local and regional political and economic con-
cerns, and by the lingering perception that the credibility
of the nation's leaders could not be assumed and that the
government, if left unchecked by expressions of the public
will, represented a potentially "dangerous" institution.
The public's desire to become involved in the policymaking
process found outward expression during the war primarily
through the medium of anti-war and peace demonstrations.
Following the war, however, it has been evidenced by a dra-
matic increase in the number of special interest groups and
informal political groups participating in the development
15
of policy. The end result has been an increase in the
attentive public's influence and an accompanying increase in
the deference shown by government officials toward the views
of the attentive public.
Finally, a process of alteration in the structural
and functional relationships within the government itself
emerged prior to and has continued during the post-Vietnam
period. Ostensibly designed to improve the operation of the
government and prevent a repetition of the type of involve-
ment and activities witnessed during the Vietnam period,
15 •An illustrative example is provided by the growth m
the number of political action committees (PACs) from 608 in
1974 to 2,551 in 1980. See Roger H. Davidson and Walter J.
Oleszek, ongress and Its Members (Washington, D.C.: Con-
gressional Quarterly Press, 1981), p. 77.
26

this process of change has derived principally from statu-
tory modifications enacted by the Congress. The changes
themselves have generally reflected a response to existing
public pressures and represented a continuation of the his-
torical cycle of competition between the executive and leg-
islative branches for dominance in the government. Repre-
sentative examples of these modifications include, but are
not limited to the following: (1) the repeal of the 1964
Southeast Asia (or Gulf of Tonkin) Resolution in 1970, thus
limiting the president's discretionary war-making powers by
removing congressional approval of the authority given the
president by the resolution "'to take all necessary measures
to repel any armed attack against the forces of the United
States and to prevent further aggression;'" (2) the passage
of the Case Act of 1972, which attempted to deal with the
guestion of secret commitments by reguiring that the execu-
tive department submit all international agreements to Con-
gress within sixty days of their execution; (3) the passage
of the War Powers Act of 1973, over President Nixon's veto,
limiting the length of time the president may commit U.S.
forces without congressional authorization to sixty days and
providing Congress with the power to disengage U.S. forces
"at any time [they] are engaged in hostilities without a
declaration of war or a specific congressional authoriza-





Impoundment Control Act of 1974, which extended and consoli-
dated congressional jurisdiction over a broadened range of
government financial matters, established revised budgetary
procedures, and created the Senate and House Budget Commit-
tees and the Congressional Budget Office (CBO); (5) the
passage of the 1976 Symington Amendment to the Foreign Mili-
tary Sales Act, forbidding "military and economic assistance
credit to countries believed to be developing a nuclear
weapons capability;" and (6) the passage of the Internation-
al Security and Arms Export Act of 1976, which prohibited
arms transfers to nations that violated human rights, lim-
ited sales to non-NATO countries by commercial vendors to
values less than $25 million, and stressed the requirement
for public disclosure and review of information relating to
arms sale transactions.
The result of the modifications made in structural
and functional relationships has been an overall shift in
the balance of governmental power away from the executive
department and toward the Congress. The impact of these
changes may be seen both in the limitation of presidential
authority in the areas of foreign policy, foreign military
arms sales and transfers, and war-making prerogatives, and
Davidson and Oleszek, pp. 330-334.
1 o
Andrew J. Pierre, The Global Politics of Arms Sales
(Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1982), pp.
50-51 and 222.

in the concomitant expansion of congressional capabilities
and authority in the areas of foreign and military affairs
and the budget process.
C. STATE OF THE ECONOMY
The third major domestic condition influencing gov-
ernment policy is the state of the economy. The United
States has recently undergone a period of economic reces-
sion, characterized by record levels of unemployment, rising
inflation rates, and a sharp decline in the productivity
growth of the industrial sector—conditions popularized by
the term "stagflation." Currently, however, the leading
economic indicators appear to reflect improving economic
conditions. Whether these improvements portend a long-term
trend of economic recovery or merely a short-term aberration
remains to be seen.
Tables 1 and 2 provide data on selected domestic
economic indicators. These tables, displaying average val-
ues and average annual rates of change for the indicators
during the period 1945 through 1982, in five-year seg-
ments (except for 1980 through 1982), demonstrate the long-
term economic conditions experienced by the U.S. since World
War II. Several trends may be observed in the data present-
ed. First, all indicators demonstrated positive average an-
nual real growth rates over the entire postwar period. Sec-
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increased with each successive period, the period averages
for the annual rates of change in these indicators fluctu-
ated significantly. The gross national product (GNP, a
measure of the total value of all goods and services pro-
duced during a year) nearly tripled from the 1945-1949 peri-
od to the 1980-1982 period, but had an average negative rate
of growth during both the 1945-1949 period, reflecting real
value declines in GNP from 1945 to 1946 and from 1946 to
1947, and again during the 1980-1982 period, reflecting a
real decline from 1981 to 1982. Similarly, both gross pri-
vate domestic investment and non-residential investment
(i.e., investment in business structures and producers'
durable equipment) more than tripled, but each had negative
average growth rates during the 1980-1982 period, reflecting
real value declines from 1979 to 1980 and from 1981 to 1982.
Third, the value of the consumer price index increased by
more than four times from the first to the last period.
This was the only indicator that demonstrated a consistently
positive rate of change, although the growth rate slowed
from the 1945-1949 period through the 1960-1964 period, and
then increased through the 1980-1982 period. Fourth, the
unemployment rate was the only indicator whose average value
decreased during any five-year period--from the 1960-1964
period to the 1965-69 period— indicating actual annual de-
clines from 1964 to 1965, 1965 to 1966, 1967 to 1968, and
1968 to 1969 in the proportion of the civilian work force
32

that was unemployed. And, fifth, the negative average rates
of change in the three monetary indicators and the accompa-
nying strongly positive changes in the unemployment rate and
the consumer price index during the 1980-1982 period are in-
dicative of the recent economic recession.
Six economic discontinuities have been identified as
contributing to the recent U.S. domestic economic condition.
These are: (1) a sharp decline in non-farm industrial pro-
ductivity—a 0.4 percent per year growth in real output per
hour from 1973 to the present, as compared to a 2.5 percent
per year growth for the period 1948 to 1973; (2) a sharp
decline in capital formation, evidenced by the decline in
the rate of gross private domestic and non-residential in-
vestments, and by a shortfall of some 2 to 3 percent of GNP
,
during the period 1973 to 1980, from the investment of 12 to
13 percent of GNP considered necessary to provide required
industrial capacity, productivity improvement, and new ener-
gy sources; (3) the increasing internationalization of the
economy--a twofold increase, from 12 to 24 percent, in the
proportion of the national economy accounted for by exports
and imports since 1970; (4) the increase in energy costs,
reflected in the increased value of petroleum imports from
$5 billion in 1972 to $105 billion in 1980; (5) chronic in-
flation—an increase from an average of slightly more than
one percent per year, during the period 1960 to 1965, to
over eight percent for the period 1975 to 1980; and (6) the
33

increased number of government regulations on industry and
the associated cost of compliance—estimates place the cumu-
lative cost of compliance with existing environmental regu-
lations at approximately $478 billion for the ten-year peri-
19
od from 1978 through 1987. " These discontinuities, serious
by themselves, represent American circumstances, and have
occurred within the larger context of the dynamic normally
associated with the evolution of an industrial society. The
forces operating in this dynamic environment include a long-
term trend toward a service economy and away from a produc-
tion economy, the societal impact of demographic changes,
shifts of comparative advantage in global trade, and changes
in consumer preferences and social objectives. These dynam-
ic forces, taken together with the identified discontinui-
ties, have resulted in the economic growth of some national
regions and the relative decline of others, and in an over-
20
all degradation in the state of the domestic economy.
Within this economic context, government activity is
both complex and dynamic. The realization of a "healthy"
domestic economy is one of the more obvious national goals.
The economy itself, however, tends to act as a constraint on
government activity, while, at the same time, government
19Reginald H. Jones, "Toward a New Industrial Policy,"
in Toward a New U.S. Industrial Policy? , eds . Michael L.
Wachter and Susan M. Wachter (Philadelphia: University of
Pennsylvania Press, 1983), pp. 13-14.
20 Ibid., p. 14.
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policies, acting variously either to improve or degrade ex-
isting economic conditions, have the potential to directly
and indirectly influence the state of the economy. The re-
sult is the emergence of two divergent governmental tenden-
cies. The first, centered primarily within the Congress, is
associated with the constitutional budgetary powers of the
legislative branch. It is reflected in a hesitancy, during
periods of deteriorating or degraded economic conditions, to
enact legislation (e.g., public statutes and appropriations)
having the potential to worsen the situation.
The second tendency is associated with the opposing
economic viewpoint. Its supporters hold the belief that the
government has the capability to modify the existing econom-
ic state through the management and alteration of government
policies. Implicit in this argument is the additional con-
viction that the government also has an obligation to alter
its policies during periods of adverse economic conditions
in order to precipitate an improvement in the state of the
economy.
Whether one or the other of these positions is "cor-
rect" and will prevail in the public forum is largely prob-
lematic. A recent congressional trend relevant to the issue
must, however, be noted. Commencing with the Ninety-sixth
Congress (1979-1980), statutory provisions have been includ-
ed in certain legislation (e.g., amendments to the Defense
Production Act of 1950), reguiring that economic impact
35

assessments be conducted and that the anticipated impact, in
each instance, be within "acceptable" limits before the leg-
islation is allowed to enter into force. These limits are
not static, however, but are determined on a case-by-case
basis through the process of committee and floor debate on
the individual congressional bill.
D. FEDERAL DEFICITS
The final domestic condition to be considered is
directly related to the state of the economy, and involves
the increase in fiscal deficits. During the period from
1973 through 1982, the annual federal budget deficit aver-
aged approximately $48 billion, with- a record high annual
deficit of $110.6 billion posted in 1982. The average an-
nual deficit for this most recent ten-year period represents
an eightfold increase over the average annual deficit of
$6.1 billion for the preceding twenty-eight years (1945
through 1972). During the same ten-year period, government
receipts increased by nearly 168 percent (from $230.8 bil-
lion in 1973 to $617.8 billion in 1982), while outlays in-
creased by almost 197 percent (from $245.6 to $728.4 bil-
lion) , and the gross federal debt increased by some 145 per-
cent (from $468.4 to $1,147 billion). 21
21U.S., President, Economic Report of the President
(Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1983), p.
248. Note: Although the monetary figures listed are in
current dollars, the percentages given are equivalent to
real growth, which is calculated using constant dollars.
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The long-term increase in government budget deficits
has resulted from the combined effects of cvo related influ-
ences. First, the range of activities undertaken by the
federal government has widened. And, second, the effects of
inflation and the expense associated with the increased size
and broadened scope of the federal government have resulted
in higher levels of government spending.
Four patterns or relationships have been identified
22with regard to federal spending. The first involves the
direct impact of inf lation--ref lected in the increased costs
23
of goods and services --on total annual government outlays.
As shown in Table 3, over the period from 1963 through 1982,
total annual federal outlays (including off-budget outlays
after 1972), in current dollars, increased by nearly seven
times, with a 10.7 percent average annual rate of growth.
During the same period, the inflation rate averaged approxi-
mately four percent. When the effects of inflation are dis-
counted, a markedly different picture of government spending
emerges. Using constant 1972 dollars, the average annual
growth rate for the period was slightly more than four per-
cent, and total outlays in 1982 were only twice those of
22 . ...Dennis S. Ippolito, The Budget and National Politics
(San Francisco: W. H. Freeman & Co., 1978), pp. 24-29.
23 .....The practice of artificially inflating the prices of
goods and services provided to the government by vendors and
contractors is not addressed here, although this practice






BUDGET GROWTH BUDGET GROWTH
YEAR OUTLAYS OUTLAYS rCri i iL OUTLAYS OUTLAYS CCA _ Cj
1963 111.3 162.8
1964 118.6 6.56 170.3 4.61
1965 118.4 -0.17 166.9 -2.00
1966 134.7 13.77 183.0 9.65
1967 157 .6 17.00 207.5 13.39
1968 178.1 13.01 224.6 8.24
1969 183.6 3.09 220.2 -1.96
1970 195.7 6.59 220.2 0.00
1971 210.2 7.41 222.6 1.09
1972 230.7 9.75 230.7 3.34
1973 245.6 245.7 6.50 233.3 233.4 1.17
1974 267.9 269.3 9.61 236.9 238.1 2.01
1975 324.5 332.3 23.39 260.2 266.7 12.01
1976 364,5 371,8 11.89 274.3 279.8 4.91
1977 400.5 409.2 10.06 280.6 286.7 2.47
1978 448.4 458.8 12.12 293.8 300.6 4.85
1979 491.0 503.5 9.74 297.2 304.8 1.40
1980 576.7 590.9 17.36 316.7 324.5 6.46
1981 657.2 678.2 14.77 327.5 338.0 4.16
1982 728.4 745.7 9.95 338.7 346.7 2.57
AVG. 307.2 312.2 10.65 243.4 246.4 4.12
TABLE 3. FEDERAL OUTLAYS IN CURRENT AND CONSTANT 1972
DOLLARS, 1963-1982 (outlays in billions of
dollars; growth rates in percent)
[Source: Office of Management and Budget, The United
States Budget in Brief, Fiscal Year 1984 (Washington, D.C
U.S. Government Printing Office, 1983), p. 69.]
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1963. These figures suggest not only the magnitude of the
real growth in government spending, but also the significant
influence of inflation on total annual government outlays.
Second is the relationship between government spend-
ing and domestic economic growth. If the gross national
product is utilized as an overall measure of the economy,
this relationship may be expressed as the percentage of GNP
represented by total government outlays. On an annual ba-
sis, this ratio provides an indication of the relative im-
portance of government expenditures to the economy, and,
taken over time, indicates the comparative rates of growth
24
of the economy and government spending.
A synopsis of this relationship for the period 1948
through 1982 is provided in Table 4. Two conclusions may be
drawn from the data presented. First, there has been a
long-term increase in the proportion of GNP represented by
federal expenditures. And, second, from 1948 through 1982,
government outlays grew at a faster rate than GNP--an aver-
age of 10.3 percent as compared to 7.6 percent. These con-
ditions suggest that government spending has assumed an in-
creasingly important role in domestic economic growth.
Third, and related to the second point, is the re-
lationship between GNP, as a measure of the economy, and the





YEAR r 3, Current $] [B, Current $1 PERCENT
1948 259.5 29.8 11.5
1949 258 . 3 38.8 15.0
1950 286.5 42.6 14.9
1951 330.8 45.5 13.8
1952 348.0 67.7 19.5
1953 366.8 76.1 20.7
1954 366,8 70.9 19.3
1955 400.0 68.5 17.1
1956 421.7 70.5 16.7
1957 444.0 76.7 17.3
1958 449.7 82.6 18.4
1959 487.9 92. 1 18.9
1960 506.5 92.2 18.2
1961 524.6 97.8 18.6
1962 565.0 106.8 18.9
1963 596.7 111.3 18.7
1964 637.7 118.6 18.6
1965 691.1 118.4 17.1
1966 756.0 134.7 17.8
1967 7.99
. 6 157.6 19.7
1968 873.4 178.1 20.4
1969 944.0 183.6 19.4
1970 992.7 195.7 19.7
1971 l ,077.6 210.2 19.5
1972 l ,185.9 230.7 19.5
1973 l ,326.4 245.7 18.5
1974 l ,434.2 269.3 18.8
1975 l ,549.2 332.3 21 .4
1976 l ,718.0 371.8 21 .6
1977 l ,918.3 409.2 21.3
1978 2 ,163.9 458.8 21.2
1979 2 ,417.8 503.5 20.8
1980 2 ,633.1 590.9 22.4
1981 2 ,937.7 678.2 23. 1
1982 3 ,057.5 745.7 24.4
TABLE 4. ]FEDERAL OUTLAYS AS PERCENTAGES OF GROSS
NATIONAL PRODUCT, 1948-1982
[Source: U.S., President, Economic Report of the Presi -
dent (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1983





GNP RATE DEBT RATE
YEAR [B 1972 $1 [%] [B 1972 $] [*]. PERCENT
1952 600.
3
+ 3.69 447.3 + 0.02 74.45
1953 623.6 + 3.79 452.2 + 1.10 72.51
1954 616.0 -1.22 454.7 + 0.55 73.71
1955 657.5 +6.74 451.0 -0.81 68.59
1956 671.6 + 2.14 434.5 -3.66 64.70
1957 683.8 + 1.82 419.5 -3.45 61.34
1958 681.0 -0.41 423.5 + 0.95 62.19
1959 721.7 + 5.98 425.7 + 0.52 58.99
1960 737.3 + 2.16 423.4 -0.54 57.43
1961 756.7 + 2.63 422.5 -0.21 55.83
1962 800.2 + 5.75 429.5 + 1.66 53.67
1963 832.6 +4.05 433.7 + 0.98 52.09
1964 876.3 + 5.25 435.3 + 0.37 49.67
1965 929.4 +6.06 434.6 -0.16 46.76
1966 984.9 + 5.97 429.3 -1.22 43.59
1967 1,011.4 + 2.69 431.7 + 0.56 42.68
1968 1,058.2 +4.63 448.0 + 3.78 42.34
1969 1,087.7 + 2.79 423.0 -5.58 38.89
1970 1,085.5 -0.20 418.4 -1.09 38.54
1971 1,122.4 + 3.40 426.5 + 1.94 38.00
1972 1,185.9 + 5.66 437.3 + 2.53 36.87
1973 1,254.3 + 5.77 442.9 + 1.28 35.31
1974 1,246.3 -0.64 422.5 -4.61 33.90
1975 1,231.6 -1.18 432.5 + 2.37 35.12
1976 1,298.2 + 5.41 477.5 +10.40 36.78
1977 1,369.7 + 5.51 506.3 + 6.03 36.96
1978 1,438.6 + 5.03 518.8 + 2.47 36.06
1979 1,479.5 + 2.84 510.2 -1.66 34.48
1980 1,474.0 -0.37 511.8 + 0.31 34.72
1981 1,502.6 + 1.94 513.5 + 0.33 34.17
AVERAGES
1952- 61 675.0 + 2.73 435.4 -0.55 64.50
1962- 71 978.9 +4.04 431.0 + 0.12 44.03
1972- 81 1,348.1 + 3.00 477.3 + 1.95 35.41
1952- 81 1,000.6 + 3.26 447.9 + 0.51 44.76
TABLE 5. GNP AND FEDERAL DEBT GROWTH RATES AND FEDERAL DEBT
AS A PERCENTAGE OF GNP, 1952-1981
[Source: U.S., President, Economic Report of the President





growth rates for GNP and the federal debt and an indication
of the federal debt as a percentage of GNP, on an annual ba-
sis and averages for ten-year periods from 1952 through
1981. In the long-term, a downward trend may be seen in the
percentage of GNP represented by the debt, indicating that
25tne economy was growing faster than the debt. The short-
term trends appear to support this conclusion. For the last
ten-year period, however, a slow-down in the economy is in-
dicated by the decrease in GNP growth. Further, the debt
grew at a rate sixteen times faster during the last as com-
pared to the second period. At the same time, the propor-
tion of the federal debt held by the public (i.e., individu-
als and private institutions) has dropped from an average of
81.8 percent for the 1952-1961 period to 75.8 percent for
the 1972-1981 period, the proportion of GNP represented by
the publicly held debt has dropped from an average of 53.2
to 26.9 percent between the same two periods, and the pro-
portion of GNP made up of private savings has increased from
16.1 to 17.0 percent, ' again indicating the reduced effect
of the federal debt on the health of the economy over the
27long-term.
25_ .ibid
. , p . 32
Economic Report of the President , pp. 163, 192 and 248
The "crowding-out effect"--the creation of disincen-
tives for and the reduction of private savings as a result
of increased federal debt--appears to have been nominally
42

The final pattern associated with government spend-
ing deals with changes in the composition of federal out-
28lays.^ Figure i illustrates the percentages of total an-
nual outlays, during the period from 1963 through 1982, rep-
resented by four federal expenditure categories: (1) na-
tional defense, (2) payments to individuals (e.g., unemploy-
ment compensation, public assistance, general retirement and
disability insurance programs, and veterans benefits and
services), (3) net interest (i.e., interest paid on the na-
tional debt), and (4) all other nondefense outlays. Outlays
in the four categories during the same period are shown, in
constant 1972 dollars, in Figure 2. These graphs suggest
several conclusions. First, the proportional and monetary
balances between "net interest" and "all other nondefense"
outlays remained relatively stable over the entire period.
Second, "national defense" outlays, in constant dollars,
also remained relatively stable. Third, outlays for "pay-
ments to individuals" increased dramatically during the
period— from $40.2 billion in 1963 to $168.3 billion in 1982
(an increase of more than four times). And, fourth, the
operative over the long-term. For example, while the feder-
al debt increased significantly during the thirty-year peri-
od, private savings as a percentage of GNP also increased
(8.0 percent average annual growth). At the same time, how-
ever, the rate of growth in personal savings as a percentage
of disposable income was much lower (0.4 percent). See
Economic Report of the President
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FIGURE 1
. EXPENDITURE CATEGORY PROPORTIONS OF TOTAL
OUTLAYS, FISCAL YEARS 1963-1982
[Source: Office of Management and Budget, The United
States Budget in Brief, Fiscal Year 1984 (Washington,
D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1983), p. 69.]
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FIGURE 2. FEDERAL OUTLAYS IN CONSTANT 1972 DOLLARS,
FISCAL YEARS 1963-1982
[Source: Office of Management and Budget, The United
States Budget in Brief, Fiscal Year 1984 (Washington,
D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1983), p. 69.]
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proportional division of total outlays between "national de-
fense" and "payments to individuals" represented a nearly
inverse relationship—that is, "national defense" declined
from approximately 46 percent to 24 percent, while "payments
to individuals" increased from nearly 25 percent to almost
50 percent.
The changes in the composition of government outlays
during the period may also be represented by the comparison
of the rates of real growth reflected in the constant dollar
values of the four categories and total outlays. These
growth rates are presented in Table 6 in the form of five-,
ten-, fifteen-year, and period summaries. Table 7 provides
a cross-comparison of the relative growth rates of each
category and total outlays. From these tables, it may be
seen, first, that although net declines occurred in the "na-
tional defense" category between 1967 and 1977, and in the
"all other nondefense" category during the periods 1968 to
1972 and 1978 to 1982, all categories of expenditures had
positive average growth rates over the entire twenty-year
period. Second, outlays for "payments to individuals" and
"net interest" grew at significantly higher rates than the
remaining categories and total outlays--e
.
g. , 11.4 times
faster than "national defense" for the former, and 10.6
times faster for the latter. And, third, the data illus-
trates both the growth in the size of the federal debt, re-
flected in the increase in expenditures within the "net
45

NATIONAL PAYMENTS TO NET ALL OTHER TOTAL
PERIOD DEFENSE NDIVIDUALS INTEREST NONDEFENSE OUTLAYS
1963-67 + 5.70 + 7.11 + 5.05 + 8.15 + 6.41
1968-72 -3.36 +11.60 + 3.82 -0.51 -2.20
1973-77 -2.35 + 8.78 +6.60 + 2.66 +4.05
1978-82 + 3.82 +4.15 +13.86 -1.66 + 3.85
1963-72 + 0.67 + 9.61 +4.37 + 3.34 +4.07
1963-77 -0.41 + 9.31 + 5.16 + 3.10 +4.06
1963-82 + 0.70 + 7.95 + 7.45 + 1.85 +4.01
TABLE 6. REAL GROWTH RATES OF OUTLAYS BY EXPENDITURE





















1.000 0.088 0.094 0.378 0.175
11.357 1.000 1.067 4.297 1.983
10.643 0.937 1.000 4.027 1.858
2.643 0.233 0.248 1.000 0.461
5.729 0.504 0.538 2.168 1.000
TABLE 7. PROPORTIONAL GROWTH RATES OF OUTLAYS BY EXPENDITURE




interest" category, and the relative importance of and the
priority placed on the funding of social programs, evidenced
by the real and proportional growth in the "payments to in-
dividuals" category.
Recognition of these continuing trends of rising
fiscal deficits and growing federal indebtedness has result-
ed in a public outcry for reductions in government spending.
The response to public opinion has been reflected in the in-
clusion of the issue of government spending, among other key
issues, in the two most recent presidential elections, in
the declaration of government fiscal policies ostensibly de-




, the Carter Administration's
"zero-based budgeting" policy and the "supply side" economic
policy, the so-called "Reaganomics , " of the Reagan Adminis-
tration—and, again, in the hesitancy of Congress to enact
legislation that might exacerbate the situation.
Efforts to reduce government spending generally take
two basic forms: (1) attempts to eliminate the occurrence
of fraud, waste, and abuse--a largely executive branch ini-
tiative, but also involving oversight activities by congres-
sional committees, the General Accounting Office ( GAO ) , and
the Congressional Budget Office (CBO)--and (2) budget cuts
made by Congress during the authorization and appropriation
process. Of the two types of initiatives, budget cuts have
a greater effect on reducing overall government spending
levels because of the larger monetary savings they entail.
47

Budget cuts may be made in either "controllable" or "uncon-
trollable" expenditure categories and programs, bur they
occur more frequently in the former due to the relative ease
29with which they may be undertaken. Defense appropriations
constitute the largest controllable expenditure category in
terms of the volume of outlays concerned, and are determined
on an annual basis. Thus, despite the strategic signifi-
cance and fundamental necessity of providing for the nation-
al security, defense appropriations—particularly those for
so-called "non-essential" programs--are perceived to be an
obvious area for cuts when Congress is faced with the fiscal
obligation to reduce the federal budget.
29 Ippolito, pp. 18-19, notes that "... controllability
reflects the extent to which outlays in a given year can be
increased or decreased under existing law. . . . 'Relative-
ly uncontrollable' outlays are those which 'are mandated
under an existing law' or which 'represent the liquidation
of a contractual obligation . . . that was made prior to the
start of the fiscal year in question. ' ... Legal commit-
ments made by [the] government in previous years . . . must
be met when due and are . . . absolutely uncontrollable.
Spending under entitlement programs, such as public assist-
ance or social security, can be controlled to a limited de-
gree by changes in authorizing legislation."
48

III. THE INTERNATIONAL CONTEXT
International conditions also influence the government's
policies and actions. This influence may be direct (i.e.,
yielding a response to international events or to changes in
the international environment), or it may be indirect (i.e.,
resulting in a response to the domestic manifestations of
international conditions). Often the distinction between
the two modes of responses becomes difficult to establish,
being largely dependent upon the lapsed time between the in-
ternational stimulus and the government's response. For ex-
ample, international conditions or events approaching or
constituting a crisis situation may produce an essentially
direct response, whereas, if the degree of criticalness is
somewhat less, ample time may be available for a domestic
reaction to be generated, and the government's response may
contain both direct components and components resulting from
domestic pressures.
A. WORLD POWER BALANCE
The overriding international condition in the modern
world is the state of the world power balance. Theorists
and practitioners agree that this condition is not static,
the consensus being that the world has evolved from a bipo-
lar condition in the aftermath of World War II. Beyond
49

this, however, agreement tends to be coincidental. One
school of thought, represented by the Realists, 30 maintains
that nations, as international actors, behave in a rational
manner, and that international relationships are based on
perceptions of the power balance between the actors. This
school believes that the international context has remained
essentially bipolar, having evolved from the "tight" bipolar
condition experienced during the Cold War years to a "loose"
bipolarity at present. Dominated by the two superpowers,
the U.S. and the Soviet Union, activity within the bipolar
international arena is seen to occur as a series of "zero-
sum" interactions--that is, an action taken by one superpow-
er results in an absolute gain or loss for that superpower
and an equal loss or gain, respectively, for the other su-
perpower. Taken in the aggregate, then, these interactions
determine the existing power balance at any point in time.
The opposing, or Neoliberal, school contends that
the postwar bipolar world has been replaced by a multipolar
international arena, in which additional power bases, such
as the People's Republic of China ( PRC ) , Western Europe,
30 . . .Representative examples of this school's positions may
be found in Kenneth N. Waltz, Theory of International Poli -
tics (Reading, Ma.: Addison-Wesley Publishing Co., 1979)
and Hans J. Morgenthau, Politics /Among Nations: The Strug-
gle for Power and Peace , 5th ed. (New York: Alfred A.
Knopf , 1973 )
.
31 For an example, see Robert 0. Keohane and Joseph S.
Nye , Power and Interdependence: World Politics in Transi -
tion (Boston: Little, Brown & Co., 1977).
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Japan, the bloc of Third World nations, cartels, interna-
tional organizations, and multinational corporations, have
emerged and must be taken into account. Within this multi-
polar context, they believe, nations represent only one of
several forms of international actors—the remaining actors
being individuals, organizations, and groups. The activi-
ties of these actors are seen to be "interdependent" (i.e.,
mutually dependent or characterized by reciprocal effects)
within a "nonzero-sum" context. That is, the actors relate
to each other in a variety of areas—militarily, diplomati-
cally, economically. Linkages may be established between
the various areas, and interactions among the actors occur
in a manner designed to maximize the actors' benefits and
minimize their costs in each area. The aggregation of these
interactions results in relative, rather than absolute,
gains and losses for the individual actors, wherein a gain
for one actor does not necessarily constitute a commensurate
loss for another.
The philosophical arguments of the Realists and the
Neoliberals, notwithstanding, the differences between the
two schools may represent a false dichotomy. The "truth" of
international relations may be postulated to exist at some
midpoint between the opposing views. It is possible that
the bipolar relationship between the United States and the
Soviet Union establishes the overriding international con-
text, while other nations, groups, and organizations
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represent conditioning influences on the power balance in
the international arena and on the actions and reactions of
the two superpowers.
Perceptions of the power balance existing between
the United States and the Soviet Union, and between the U.S.
and the remaining world nations, individually and collec-
tively, provide the general context within which American
policymakers assess threats to security. Additionally,
taken together with other factors—e.g., international and
domestic events and conditions—these perceptions structure
the development of the government's foreign and military
policies, and, to a more limited degree, its domestic poli-
cies. The overall perception of the balance, in turn, is
shaped by the perceived balances found in a variety of sub-
ordinate areas. These subordinate areas consist of both
tangible and intangible factors and include, but are not
limited to, considerations of strategic and theater nuclear
weapons, conventional military forces, economic power, in-
dustrial capacity and potential, diplomatic strength, domes-
tic vitality and cohesiveness , and public will. Within the
overall structure of the international power balance, a per-
ceived or actual disadvantage in one subordinate area may be
partially or wholly offset by an advantage in another area
or areas. Conversely, disadvantages in two or more areas





B. DETERIORATION OF U.S. POWER
Directly related to considerations of the power bal-
ance is the apparent deterioration of the United States'
position as the leading nation in world affairs. This con-
dition has been evidenced by a weakening of U.S. influence
as both a world leader and the leader of the Western bloc,
as a conseguence of a perceived erosion of American resolve
and confidence, and by a perceived decline in the position
of dominance once held by the United States in the areas of
military strength, economic power, and diplomatic influence.
The decline of American prestige in the internation-
al forum since World War II--and particularly since the end
of the Vietnam War—has not been a strictly zero-sum loss
for the United States and a commensurate gain for the Soviet
Union, as the nation's principal adversary. Instead, the
diffusion of the traditional Cold War power bases, primarily
as a conseguence of the growing influence of Third and
32Fourth World nations and multinational corporations, and,
secondarily, by the reflection of this rising influence in
existing international organizations, has resulted in a con-
dition wherein U.S. losses are absorbed not only by the
32 ....A distinction is sometimes made between two economi-
cally different groups among the so-called less developed
countries (LDCs)--the "developing" or Third World nations,
many of which are semi-industrialized, and the "least devel-
oped" or Fourth World nations, consisting of the world's
poorest nations. See Roger D. Hansen, Beyond the North-




Soviet Union, but also by other international actors.
the absence of other factors, the end result, however, as in
the zero-sum situation, has been a decline in U.S. influence
and a relative increase in that of the Soviet Union.
At the conclusion of World War II, the United States
possessed the strongest military force in the world, having
one of the largest standing armies and the largest navy, and
being the only nation with atomic weapons. Its economy and
national industrial plant were the world's strongest, having
been spared the ravages of war, unlike those of either its
European allies or its enemies—Germany, Italy, and Japan.
And, its wartime ascendancy to a position of leadership
among the Allies, occurring, in large measure, as a result
of its military strength and economic vitality, was trans-
lated into a position of international leadership during the
immediate postwar years. Over the nearly forty years since
World War II, however, the American position of undisputed
military and economic strength and international leadership
has slowly diminished, resulting in a perceived shift in the
overall balance of world power in favor of the Soviet Union.
Perhaps the most important and the most easily ob-
servable area of U.S. decline has been in the military bal-
ance between the United States and the Soviet Union. Three
primary measures demonstrate this decline. First, the
Soviet Union has achieved, at the least, a condition of
rough parity in nuclear weapons. The virtual monopoly in
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nuclear weapons enjoyed by the U.S. between July 1945, when
it exploded the world's first atomic bomb, and August 1949,
when the Soviet Union exploded its first fission device,"
has been supplanted by the growth of Soviet nuclear
strength. As Table 8 indicates, the Soviet Union now pos-
sesses more strategic nuclear-capable missiles and total
nuclear delivery vehicles than does the United States, al-
though the U.S. has slightly less than one thousand more
intercontinental and submarine launched ballistic missile
(ICBM and SLBM) warheads and in excess of three hundred more
nuclear bombs. At the same time, the lack of a viable U.S.
anti-ballistic missile (ABM) defense capability and Soviet
improvements in warhead and guidance technology have result-
ed in recent American concern regarding the vulnerability of
the U.S. ICBM forces. 34
35In terms of nonstrategic nuclear forces, the
United States has a slight edge in delivery systems, but
lags behind the Soviet Union in total numbers of nuclear
33Norman Polmar, Strategic Weapons: An Introduction
,
rev. ed. (New York: Crane Russak, 1982), p. 19.
34 ...Report of the President's Commission on Strategic
Forces
, by Brent Scowcroft, Chairman (Washington, D.C.:
Government Printing Office, 1983), pp. 4-12.
35 ...Current usage distinguishes between two major groups
of nuclear forces. Strategic nuclear forces are generally
considered to include only intercontinental-range (over
3,000 ran [5,500 km]) weapons and delivery systems, while
nonstrategic nuclear forces, formerly termed theater and


















1,052 1.00:1.33 1,398 -346
2,152 1.00:2.14 4,600 -2,448
36 1 .00:2.33 84 -48
576 1.00:1 .72 989 -413
5,072 3.11:1.00 1,630 +3,442
376 1 .75:1.00 215 + 161
676 2.25:1.00 300 + 376
Delivery Systems 2,004 1.00:1.30 2,602 -598







312 1.00:8.01 2,500 -2,188
Notes: [1] Includes heavy and medium strategic bombers.
[2] Includes active and reserve aircraft assigned
to strategic air defense, but not 160 U.S. air-
craft assigned a strategic air defense backup
mission.
TABLE U.S. AND USSR STRATEGIC FORCES, 1981
[Sources: The Military Balance 1981-1982 (London: Interna-
tional Institute for Strategic Studies, 1981), pp. 5, 10-11,
and 104-107; U.S., Department of Defense, Soviet Military
Power (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1983),
pp. 19-24; and Has America Become Number Two?: An Assessment
of American Defenses and the U,
(Washington, D.C.




Committee on the Present Danger, 1982),
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warheads, as shown in Table 9. The deployment of U.S. long-
range theater nuclear force ( LRTNF ) weapons to Western Eu-
rope, commencing in late 1983, will alter the distribution
of the nonstrategic forces shown, but will not change the
final balance. The deployment of these weapons, resulting
from a 1979 North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) deci-
sion, will raise the number of U.S. intermediate- and medi-
um-range nuclear weapons (each with a single warhead) by
572, but reduce its total of short-range weapons by an egual
number— 108 Pershing II missiles, with a range of 1,100
miles (1,800 km), to replace 108 shorter range Pershing IA
missiles, and 464 ground launched cruise missiles ( GLCMs )
,
with a range of 1,550 miles (2,500 km), to replace an egual
number of older nuclear munitions. Similarly, current
U.S. nuclear force modernization programs, including the de-
velopment of nuclear-capable sea launched and air launched
cruise missiles ( SLCMs and ALCMs ) and their deployment dur-
ing the mid-1980s, are intended to improve U.S. nuclear
(1,500-3,000 nm [2,800-5,500 km]), medium- range (600-
1,500 nm [1,100-2,800 km]), and short-range (under 600 nm)
weapons and delivery platforms. See Polmar, p. 21; U.S.,
Department of Defense, Annual Report to the Congress, Fiscal
Year 1984 (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office,
1983), pp. 56-57; and U.S., Joint Chiefs of Staff, United
States Military Posture for FY 1984 (Washington, D.C.:
Government Printing Office, 1983), pp. 13-20.
Raymond L. Garthoff, "The NATO Decision on Theater


































1,250 4.63:1.00 270+ + 980





2 , 125 n.a .
+1,436
TABLE 9. U.S. AND USSR NONSTRATEGIC NUCLEAR FORCES, 1981
[Sources: The Military Balance 1981-1982 (London: Interna-
tional Institute for Strategic Studies, 1981), pp. 5, 11,
and 104-107; John M. Collins, U.S. -Soviet Military Balance:
Concepts and Capabilities 1960-1980 (New York: McGraw-Hill
Publications Co., 1980), p. 483; and Richard Halloran,
"Report to Congress Provides Figures for Nuclear Arsenal,"
New York Times , 15 November 1983, sec. K, p. 7.]
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capabilities, while, at the same time, maintaining constant
37
nuclear rorce levels.
The second measure of the relative U.S. military de-
cline is the imbalance that exists between U.S. and Soviet
conventional forces. This imbalance may be seen in both the
size of each country's armed forces and in the quantities of
military equipment each possesses. Table 10 provides a sum-
mary of U.S. and Soviet military personnel levels for 1981,
indicating that the Soviet armed forces were nearly twice
the size of those of the U.S., and that the total number of
defense-related personnel (including paramilitary forces,
reserves, and civilian employees) in the Soviet Union was
more than two and one-half times greater than the U.S. to-
tal. Further, as Tables 11, 12, and 13 reflect for 1981,
although the United States enjoyed a numerical advantage in
the equipment categories of naval reserve ships; navy tacti-
cal, anti-submarine warfare (ASW), early warning (EW), and
reconnaissance aircraft; anti-tank weapons, including anti-
tank guided missile launchers ( ATGMs ) ; support aircraft; and
helicopters, it was numerically inferior to the Soviet Union
in all other military equipment categories.
The development of substantive conclusions concern-
ing the U.S. -Soviet nuclear and conventional balances on the
basis of the type of tabular data presented above, however,
"3 "7
U.S., Joint Chiefs of Staff, United States Military





--Army 77o 1:2.35 1,825
--Navy 528 1.19:1 443
—Marines 188 15.67:1 12
--Air Force 558 1:2.54 1,415 [1]
Total Armed Forces 2,049 1:1.80 3,695
Paramilitary, Frontier 45 [2] 1:12.44 560 [3]
and Internal Security
Reserves 891 [4] 1:5.61 5,000 [5]
Civilian Employees 940 1.28:1 732
Total Personnel 3,925 1:2,54 9,987
Notes: [1] Including Strategic Rocket Force ( SRF ) and
Air Defense Force (PVO-Strany) personnel.
[2] U.S. Coast Guard personnel.
[3] Including 300,000 KGB border guards and
260,000 MVD security troops.
[4] Including 11,600 Coast Guard reserves.
[5] Reserve obligation for Soviet conscripts
extends to age 50. Figure shown is for
conscripts incurring reserve obligation
during preceding five years.
TABLE 10. U.S. AND USSR iMILITARY PERSONNEL, 1981 (in thousands)
[Sources: The Military Balance 1981-1982 (London, England:
International Institute for Strategic Studies, 1981), pp.
6-14; and Has America Become Number Two?: An Assessment of
American Defenses and the U.S. -USSR Military Balance (Wash-




















158 [1] 1:1.07 169 [2]
4 1:120.5 482
78 1:3.31 258 [3]

























Notes: [1] Includes 67 ships and 91 craft (LCUs).
[2] Includes 84 ships and 85 craft (35 LCUs and
50 hovercraft).
[3] Including 58 intelligence collections ships
Auxiliary force can be augmented by 2,475
civilian sealift ships.
[4] Including 46 active and 98 inactive naval
reserve ships and 162 cargo vessels.
[5] Includes 115 submarines, 25 major surface
combatants, and 20 minesweepers.
[6] Includes transport, in-flight refueling,
utility, and training aircraft.
TABLE 11. U.S. AND USSR -NAVAL FORCES, 1981
[Source: The Military Balance 1981-1982 (London, England:
International Institute for Strategic Studies, 1981), pp. 5,
7-8, 10, and 12-13.]
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U.S. [ 1 ] RATIO USSR [ 2
]
Tanks 11,975 1:3.76 45,000
Armored Combat Vehicles 20,935 1:2.95 62,000
ATGM Launchers/Ant i -Tank 16,600 1.61:1 10,287-
Weapons
Artillery/Multiple Rocket 14,380 1:2.08 29,900
Launchers











Notes: [1] Includes U.S. Army and Marine Corps.
[2] Includes Soviet Army, Naval Infantry, and
Air Defense Force ( PVO-Strany )
.
TABLE 12. U.S. AND USSR CONVENTIONAL GROUND FORCES, 1981
[Source: The Military Balance 1981-1982 (London, England:




Long- and Medium-Range 412 1:1.58 650
Bombers
Tactical 4,442 1:1.65 7,315
EW/RECCE/AWACS/ASW 1,121 1:1.07 1,199
Support 3,563 1 .24:1 2,865
Helicopters 9,176 2 .06:1 4,445
TABLE 13. U.S. AND USSR MILITARY AIRCRAFT, 1981 (All
Services, Including Reserves)
[Source: The Military Balance 1981-1982 (London, England




is very problematic. In the first place, given that the
numbers of Soviet nuclear warheads, delivery vehicles, and
conventional weapons are not explicityly known, the figures
must be derived from available information, often resulting
in considerable variation among the estimates of the nuclear
and conventional balances provided by diverse Government
agencies and private institutions and individuals. Second,
because the information is not readily available, such esti-
mates generally include scant data relating to weapons re-
load capabilities and the guantities of stockpiled weapons.
Third, even if exact numbers were reliably known, they would
not necessarily provide a clear view of the balances, in as
much as numerical balance statistics do not capture such
factors as comparative technological capabilities and em-
ployment philosophies, which are normally addressed as cave-
ats to the estimates in an effort to demonstrate that the
numerically disadvantageous position of the U.S. is offset
by its more effective style of command and control, and by
its technological advantage relative to the Soviet Union.
38 For detailed discussions of the impact of technology
and employment philosophies on military doctrine, the mili-
tary balance, and balance stability, see Thomas A. Brown,
"Number Mysticism, Rationality and the Strategic Balance,"
Orbis 21 (Fall 1977 ): 493-496 ; Philip S. Kronenberg, "Nation-_
al Security Planning: Images and Issues," in Planning U.S.
Security: Defense Policy in the Eighties , ed. Philip S.
Kronenberg (New York: Pergamon Press, 1982), pp. 105-106;
and William J. Perry, "Technological Prospects," in Re -
thinking the U.S. Strategic Posture , ed. Barry M. Blechman




And, fourth, unless tabulations of U.S. and Soviet force
levels and total numbers of nuclear and conventional weapons
integrate the forces and weapons of each superpower's allies
and address the geographic distribution of forces, regional
balances existing between the superpowers may be overlooked
or distorted.
What may be gained from numerical analyses, however,
is a sense of the changes in the balances over time. The
overall trend of these changes has favored the Soviet Union.
In this regard, during 1982, the Aspen Consortium on Arms
Control and Security Issues of the Aspen Institute for
Humanistic Studies noted that, over the past twenty years,
. . . increases in Soviet military forces have al-
tered U.S. perceptions of appropriate strategic poli-
cies. The buildup of Soviet capabilities has included
substantial' improvement in conventional forces . . .
[and] there has been a sustained accumulation and mod-
ernization of Soviet nuclear forces. . . .
. . . In a number of measures of strategic capa-
bilities, the lead has passed from American to Soviet
hands. . . . Whether one feels that the Soviets have
achieved superiority or parity, the strategic balance
is clearly less favorable from an American perspective
than it once was.
The final measure of the military imbalance between
the United States and the Soviet Union involves annual de-
fense expenditures and the production of military equipment.
Western estimates place Soviet defense spending at between
39 .Barry M. Blechman, ed., Rethinking tne U.S. Strategic




12 and 15 percent of the Soviet gross national product, and
the increase in Soviet defense outlays, for the past twenty
years, at approximately four percent real annual growth.
American defense expenditures, in contrast, amount to about
40 . .
six percent of GNP and have exhibited an average of less
41than tnree percent real annual growth over the past decade.
When the lower Soviet manpower costs and the relative size
of the Soviet GNP (roughly half that of the U.S.) are taken
into account, these figures translate into a Soviet invest-
ment in defense, during the last ten years, that has been
approximately 80 percent higher than that of the United
42States
.
Similarly, with regard to existing and potential de-
fense industrial base capacity and the production of mili-
tary equipment, the United States has been surpassed by the
Soviet Union. While the American defense industrial base
has experienced significant deterioration, reflected in
aging industrial plant equipment, shortages of skilled
manpower, lagging productivity growth, negligible production
surge capability, and decreased investment in defense indus-
tries, in general, the Soviet Union's military industrial
40Jacques S. Gansler, "We Can Afford Security," Foreign
Policy 51 (Summer 1983):68-69.
4
1
Economic Report of the President , pp. 246-247.
42Gansler, "We Can Afford Security," p. 68.
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base ha.s grown steadily since the late 1950s. Consisting
of more than 150 major plants and supported by numerous
feeder plants, the Soviet production base in now acknowl-
edged to be the largest in the world. This growth in Soviet
defense industrial capacity has, additionally, been accom-
panied by a large research and development (R&D) effort, the
outlays for which have been estimated to be approximately




The expanded Soviet industrial base and large de-
fense procurement and R&D outlays have provided the means
for increased military hardware production levels to support
the recent program of expanding and improving the operation-
al capabilities of the Soviet armed forces. A comparison of
U.S. and Soviet military production rates, for the period
1972 through 1974, is provided in Table 14. The data indi-
cates that, in all major military equipment categories, ex-
cept helicopters, the Soviet production rate was higher than
that of the U.S. Similar production statistics, for the
period 1978 through 1982, reflect a continuation of this
43 Ibid. See also, U.S., Congress, House, Committee on
Armed Services, Defense Industrial Base Panel, The Ailing
Defense Industrial Base: Unready for Crisis , Committee
Print 29 (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office,
1980), pp. 11-17.
44 ...U.S., Department of Defense, Soviet Military Power ,




trend in all categories except major naval combatants, where


















TABLE 14. U.S. AND USSR AVERAGE ANNUAL MILITARY EQUIPMENT
PRODUCTION RATES, 197 2-1974
[Source: Jacgues S. Gansler, The Defense Industry (Cam-
bridge, Ma.: MIT Press, 1980), p. 25.]
The second major indicator of the deterioration of
the position of the United States within the international
arena is the decline of American economic vitality. This
condition is evidenced by declining industrial productivity,
a reduction in the proportion of both domestic and foreign
markets held by U.S. industries, and financial difficulties
in a number of key industries, some of which, such as the
auto, steel, merchant marine, and shipbuilding industries,
are critical to national defense.
45 Ibid., pp. 78-80
46Margaret E. Dewar, ed. , Industry Vitalization: Toward
a National Industrial Policy , with a Foreword by Harian
Cleveland (New York: Pergamon Press, 1982), p. xi .
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Industrial productivity provides one measure of eco-
nomic vitality. This measure tends to be cyclical, however,
reflecting changes in economic conditions and fluctuations
in market demand. That is, productivity tends to increase
in response to a growing demand for the goods produced and
during periods of vigorous economic conditions, reflecting
both changes in spending patterns and increased investment
in industrial capital stocks. Conversely, productivity
tends to decrease with decreased demand and reductions in
industrial investment. For example, as Figure 3 illus-
trates, U.S. production indexes have fluctuated considerably
since World War II. It may be noted from this graph, first,
that the index for total industrial production and its three
included indexes--materials , intermediate products, and
final products— increased throughout the thirty-five year
period. Second, the indexes for materials, final products,
and total industrial production followed the same general
pattern, reflecting a declining positive growth rate in the
aftermath of World War II and the Korean War, a dramatic in-
crease during the mid-1960s, a sharp decline during the
late-1960s, a moderate increase during the mid-1970s, and a
moderate decline to the present. Third, the index for in-
termediate products matched the other indexes through the
1962-1966 period, but has had a consistently declining posi-
tive growth rate since that time. And, finally, all four
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FIGURE 3. AVERAGE RATES OF CHANGE IN U.S
INDEXES, 1947-1981
PRODUCTION
[Source: U.S., President, Economic Report of the




during the past five years, indicating a slowing in indus-
trial productivity, and, therefore, a decline in economic
vitality.
As noted above, two of the primary factors contrib-
uting to productivity are investments in industry--nonresi-
dential investment, principally investments in producers'
durable eguipment, but also including investments in
1962-66 1967-71 1972-76 1977-81 1962-81
Gross National +5.42 +2.66 +3.00 +2.99 +3.52
Product (GNP)
Gross Private +9.48 +1.52 +2.39 +4.59 +4.50
Domestic
Investment
Nonresidential +10.21 +0.83 +2.68 +6.63 +5.09
Investment
Investment in +7.67 -0.23 -1.31 +5.59 +2.93
Business
Structures





TABLE 15. AVERAGE REAL GROWTH IN DOMESTIC INVESTMENT,
1962-1981
[Source: U.S., President, Economic Report of the President
(Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1983), p.
164. ]
business structures--and market demand for the output of in-
dustry. As shown in Table 15, during the period from 1962
through 1981, nonresidential investments grew at an average
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real rate of slightly more than five percent. Subsequent to
a sharp decline following the 1961-1966 period, the average
ra-ce of growth in nonresidential investments has increased
to the present (despite real annual declines from 1978
through 1980, from +12.8 to -2.2 percent). Similarly, in-
vestments in producers' durable equipment, which averaged
slightly less than 44 percent of gross private domestic in-
vestment and 64 percent of nonresidential investment over
47the twenty-year period, have increased consistently from
the 1967-1971 period, onward. Investments in business
structures, however, declined from the 1962-1966 through the
1972-1976 period, before demonstrating a relatively strong
average real growth rate to the present. Additionally, the
percentage of gross private domestic investment made up by
nonresidential investments has shown a long-term increase--
from approximately 62.7 percent, on the average, for the
1962-1966 period, to slightly more than 72 percent for the
48 .1977-1981 period. Strictly on the basis of investment,
then, an increase in industrial productivity would be ex-
pected—during the last five-year period, as a minimum. As
previously discussed and as illustrated in Figure 3, how-
ever, the opposite trend has actually occurred, suggesting
that market demand had a greater effect than investments.




The influence of market demand on industrial produc-
tivity is reflected directly in the volume of product sales
and indirectly in business profits. That is, when demand
increases, industry responds by increasing productivity to
provide more goods for sale. Similarly, higher sales vol-
umes translate, potentially, to higher profits, although the
level of profits will depend upon both income (sales) and
outlays (expenses and investments), taking the effects of
inflation into account. From Table 16, it may be seen that
the patterns of the real growth rates of domestic sales and
corporate profits (except profits within the financial in-
dustry category), from 1962 through 1981, parallel those of
the industrial productivity indexes shown in Figure 3. Of
particular interest is the manufacturing industry category,
which displayed a negative real growth of -0.02 percent in
sales during the 1967-1971 period, a declining growth of
+2.71 percent during the most recent five-year period, and
negative real growth rates in profits during the 1967-1971
and 1977-1981 periods (-6.57 and -2.74 percent, respective-
ly) . The figures provided suggest a short-term slow-down in
productivity during the last five years and point, again, to
declining economic vitality.
An indication of the economic strength and vitality
of the United States, relative to other nations, may be
achieved by comparing economic growth rates, measured by
changes in gross national products, and rates of growth in
72

1962-66 1967-71 1972-76 1977-81 1962-81
SALES:
Total Manufac- +5.19 +1.27 +5.20 +3.08 +3.69
turing and
Trade
Manufacturing +5.57 -0.02 +5.28 +2.71 +3.38
Wholesale Trade +5.06 +4.39 +7.56 +5.52 +5.63
Retail Trade +4.63 +1.43 +3.34 +1.39 +2.70
CORPORATE PROFITS :
All Domestic +8.20 -4.07 +7.08 -1.39 +2.46
Industries
Financial + 2.09 + 5.86 -0.33 + 0.37 + 2.00
Industry
Non-Financial + 9.18 -5.56 + 9.15 -1.36 + 2.85
Industries*
Manufacturing +10.31 -6.57 + 9.51 -2.74 + 2.63
Transportation +6.40 -9.99 + 9.03 -0.97 + 1.12
and Public
Utilities
Wholesale and +8.70 +3.27 +9.17 +1.28 +5.61
Retail Trade
Other +9.18 -3.35 +10.54 +2.48 +4.71
* Includes manufacturing, transportation and public utilities,
wholesale and retail trade, and other industries.
TABLE 16. AVERAGE REAL GROWTH IN DOMESTIC SALES AND CORPO-
RATE PROFITS, 1962-1981
[Source: U.S., President, Economic Report of the President





industrial productivity, measured by changes in industrial
production indexes, for individual nations or groups of na-
tions. Table 17 provides a comparison summary of the growth
1960-73 1974-81 1978 1979 1980 1981 1960-81
United States 4.1 2.7 4.8 3.2 -0.2 2.0 3.59
5.1 5.6 4.2 2.9 8.23
3.7 3.0 0.0 3.0 4.51
3.7 3.5 1.6 0.3 4.60
2.7 4.9 4.0 -0.2 4.07
3.3 1.4 -1.7-0.8 2.30
3.6 4.3 1.8-0.3 3.79




France 5.8 2 . 5
Italy 5.2 2.1
United Kingdom 3.1 0.9
West Germany 4.7 2.2
U.S. Rank 6th 2nd 2nd 5th 6th 3rd 6th
Developed 5.1 2.7 4.1 3.5 1.2 1.4 4.23
Countries
Developing 5.8 4.4 4.3 4. 1 4.5 2.7 5.29
Countries
Communist 5.2 2.7 4.2 1.6 1.9 1.2 4.29
Countries
Soviet Union 5.2 2.3 3.4 0.8 1.5 1.8 4. 15
World Total 5.2 2.9 3.8 2.8 1.8 1.8 4.36
TABLE 17. GROWTH RATES IN REAL GROSS NATIONAL PRODUCT,
1960-1981
[Source: U.S., President, Economic Report of the President
(Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1983), p.
285. ]
rates in real GNP, during the twenty-two years from 1960
through 1981, for the U.S., six industrialized nations of
the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development
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(OECD), the Soviet Union, and four aggregate nation groups
(developed countries, including OECD countries, South Afri-
ca, and non-OECD Europe; developing countries, including
fourteen oil exporting nations, among others; communist
countries; and the world community). It may be seen that
the average U.S. GNP growth rate exceeded that of its six
OECD partners and the Soviet Union only during the 1974-1981
period--and then by only two-tenths and four-tenths of one
percent, respectively. During the 1960-1973 period and over
the entire twenty-two years, U.S. economic growth occurred
at a slower rate than that of all other listed nations and
nation groups, with the single exception of the United King-
dom. Additionally, it is noteworthy that throughout the en-
tire period, and particularly in 1978 and 1981, when U.S.
GNP growth was somewhat more rapid, the economic growth of
the United States consistently lagged behind that of Japan.
Included in calculations of GNP growth rates, but
egually important by itself in comparing the economic vi-
talities of individual nations, is industrial productivity
growth. Table 18 compares the average U.S. industrial pro-
duction index and the growth in U.S. industrial productivi-
ty, from 1962 through 1981, with the average indexes and
growth rates of the six OECD members previously employed.
It must be noted that the industrial production indexes are
not: strictly comparable between countries, being a represen-
tation of each nation's industrial output scaled to a base
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year (in this instance, 1967). Changes in the production
indexes a.re comparable, however, in as much as variations in
1962-66 1967-71 1972-76 1977-81 1962-81
INDEX [1967=100]
United States 83.6 107.0 125.4 147.0 115.8
japan 69.3 131.2 177.3 216.1 14)
Canada 83.1 111.4 142.7 161.9 124.8
France 89.0 113.2 143.2 157.4 130.7
Italy 81.1 110.4 133.8 156.0 120.3
United Kingdom 93.1 107.7 117.6 124.9 110.8


























Average of six 85.2 115.6 143.0 162.4 126.6
(excludes U.S.)
GROWTH RATE
United States 7.97 2.35 3.83 3.02 4.29






6.02 3.18 2.24 4.52
U.S. Rank 2nd 6th 3rd 2nd 4th
TABLE 18. AVERAGE INDUSTRIAL PRODUCTION INDEXES AND GROWTH
OF INDUSTRIAL PRODUCTION, 1962-1981
[Source: U.S. President, Economic Report of the President
(Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1983), p.
286. ]
the sizes of the industrial bases and in the volumes of the
industrial outputs for the countries are discounted. By ex-
amining the productivity growth and changes in the rates of
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growth, a representative comparison of the industrial vitali-
ties of the individual nations may be achieved.
From the data presented, it may be observed that the
average growth in U.S. productivity exceeded that of the
United Kingdom throughout the twenty-year period. It ex-
ceeded that of France and West Germany during three of the
four five-year subperiods (1962-1966, 1972-1976, and 1977-
1981), Canada and Italy during two subperiods (1962-1966 and
1977-1981), and Japan during only one subperiod (1972-1976).
Additionally, a real decline of some 5.6 percent occurred in
average U.S. productivity growth between the first and sec-
ond five-year subperiods, compared with an average 0.6 per-
cent decline for the six OECD nations. Between the second
and third subperiods, the U.S. had a real improvement of
nearly 1.5 percent, while the six OECD nations declined by
slightly more than 2.8 percent, on the average--perhaps in-
dicating the greater influence on these nations of the 1973
Organization of Oil Exporting Countries (OPEC) oil embargo
and the deterioration of world economic conditions. Final-
ly, U.S. productivity exhibited a real decline of roughly
0.8 percent between the third and fourth subperiods, com-
pared with an average decline of slightly more than 0.9 per-
cent for the OECD nations.
The deterioration of the United States' post-World
War II international economic position may also be seen in
the trends evidenced in the balance between its exports and
77

imports, and by changes in the nature of its exports and im-
ports. Graph A of Figure 4 displays U.S. exports and im-
ports as proportions of uotal U.S. foreign trade, and Graph
B illustrates the rates of growth of exports and imports
from 1962 through 1981. From Graph A, it may be seen that
the proportional share of exports declined by more than ten
percent over the period (from nearly 57 percent to slightly
more than 46 percent), while that of imports increased by an
equal amount (from slightly more than 43 to nearly 54 per-
cent). Graph B indicates that while both exports and im-
ports had positive average rates of growth from 1962 through
1981, reflecting a long-term increase in the monetary values
of exports and imports, and, thus, in total foreign trade,
the average growth rate of imports exceeded that of exports
throughout the period. Taken together, these conditions,
suggest that the United States is becoming increasingly more
import dependent.
An examination of the composition of U.S. exports
and imports, for the period 1965 through 1981, reveals,
first, that, on the basis of monetary value, exports con-
sisted, on the average, of roughly 20 percent agricultural
products, 33 percent capital goods, and 47 percent other
goods, and that the proportional breakdown remained rela-
tively stable throughout the period, varying less than five
percent (plus or minus), annually, from these averages.
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the period. The most pronounced change occurred in the area
of petroleum imports, which demonstrated more than a three-
fold increase, from an average of less than nine percent at
the beginning of the period to more than 28 percent at the
end. Imports of industrial supplies and materials decreased
by nearly half, from approximately 41 to 23 percent. Im-
ports of other goods remained relatively stable, however,
varying less than ten percent (plus or minus) from a period
49
average of 53 percent.
U.S. patterns of trade have also changed during the
last decade, with the changes, again, being more pronounced
in the area of import relations. As Figure 5 illustrates,
based on monetary value, approximately half of all U.S. ex-
ports, during the period 1971 through 1982, went to other
industrialized nations, and half of its imports came from
them. Exports to non-oil exporting developing countries and
to the Soviet Union and Eastern European countries have re-
mained relatively stable, as shown in Graph A, with the
former increasing from roughly 25 percent to 30 percent of
total exports, while the latter varied between one and three
percent of the total. Marked changes occurred, however, in
exports to oil exporting developing countries and exports
classified as other and special categories. U.S. exports to
oil exporting countries rose from 5.3 percent of the total,
49
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between 1971 and 1974, to 10.6 percent for the period 1975
through 1978. Between 1979 and 1981, the proportion dropped
to 8.2 percent, and then rose again to 10.4 percent in 1932.
Exports within the other and special categories decreased by
nearly 75 percent from an average of 8.3 percent, during the
first five years of the period, to 2.2 percent, during the
50last seven years.
Similar proportional increases and decreases in the
patterns of trade were evidenced in U.S. imports, as shown
in Graph B of Figure 5. Imports from the Soviet Union and
Eastern Europe remained stable, accounting for less than one
percent of the total. A moderate increase occurred, over
the period, in imports from non-oil exporting developing
countries (from approximately 21 to 27 percent), and imports
within the other and special categories decreased (from 4.9
to 3 percent). As was the case with exports, imports from
oil exporting developing countries increased sharply, from
an average of 5.1 percent, for the period 1971 through 1973,
to 19.8 percent, for 1974 through 1981, and then decreased
51to 12.3 percent m 1982.
50Direction of Trade Statistics Annual 1971-77 (Washing-
ton, D.C.: International Monetary Fund, 1977), pp. 267-268
and 303; Direction of Trade Statistics Yearbook 1983 (Wash-






Although the total value of U.S. exports, in con-
stant dollars, actually declined in 1977, and total value
of exports and imports decline in 1975, 1981, and 1982, the
total monetary value of both exports and imports generally
increased (i.e., the average constant dollar value for the
last five years of the period exceeded that of the first
five years) during the 1971 through 1982 period— a 165.3
percent increase in the former and an increase of 187.8 per-
cent in the latter. Considerable variation occurred, how-
ever, within the trade sectors based on trading partners.
Trade with other industrialized nations was approximately
balanced, with exports exhibiting an increase of 163.8 per-
cent and imports a 162.2 percent increase. A moderate in-
crease of 142.3 percent in exports and 120.6 percent in im-
ports occurred in trade with the Soviet Union and the East-
ern European nations. Trade within the other and special
categories was the only area that evidenced a decline. In
these categories, exports during the last five years of the
period were only 45.5 percent of those of the first five
years. Imports, however, increased by 121.3 percent. The
most significant increases occurred in trade with developing
countries. U.S. exports to non-oil exporting countries in-
creased by 193.2 percent and imports from them by 205.2 per-
cent. And, exports to the oil exporting countries increased
by 228.5 percent, while imports from them increased by
83

52332.1 percent. It must be noted, however, that the more
than threefold increase in the value of U.S. imports from
the oil exporting nations resulted, in large measure, not
from an increase in the volume of petroleum imports, but
from increases in world crude oil prices as a conseguence of
an OPEC-orchestrated price increase of some 350 percent
(from $2.59 to $11.65 per barrel) in early 1974, and a sec-
ond OPEC price increase of nearly 175 percent (to $32 per
barrel in late 1980. 53
Several conclusions are suggested by the data pre-
sented above. First, on the basis of the costant dollar
value of its exports and imports, with the exception of
1975, the United States has been a net importer nation since
1971 (i.e., the annual value of imports has exceeded the
value of exports, resulting in an international trade defi-
cit for the nation). For the period from 1971 through 1974,
the trade deficit averaged nearly $6 billion annually in
54
constant 1972 dollars, and the average annual deficit from
551976 through 1982 was over $22 billion.
32^, .Ibid .
53 Ezra Solomon, Beyond the Turning Point; The U.S.
Economy in the 1980s (San Francisco: W. H. Freeman & Co.,
1982), pp. 75-82.
54 . .Dirction of Trade Statistics Annual 1971-77
, pp. 267-
268 and 303.





Second, compared with other major developed nations,
the United State's balance of trade position has deterio-
rated. During the 1960s and early 1970s, U.S. trade sur-
pluses were generally larger than those of its primary OECD
partners (Japan, Canada, France, Italy, the United Kingdom,
and West Germany) and the Soviet Union. Since the mid-
1970s, however, the relative positions have been reversed,
with the United States running larger annual trade deficits
56than the other major industrialized nations.
And, finally, although increases in the price of
crude oil in 1974 and 1980 effected both the total monetary
value of U.S. foreign trade and the proportional share of
imports from oil exporting developing countries, they did
not significantly alter the post-1971 U.S. status as a net
importer nation. When trade with the oil exporting nations
is excluded from the totals, the net importer status is
changed in only two years--1974 (from an $8.2 billion trade
deficit to a $194 million surplus) and 1980 (from a deficit
57
of $20.3 billion to a surplus of $2.2 billion). Al-
though this suggests that the U.S. was vulnerable to the oil
price increases that occurred in those years, it also indi-
cates that other factors may have had a more significant
Economic Report of the President
, p. 283.
57Direction of Trade Statistics Annual 1971-77 , pp. 267-




impact in producing the net importer status. One possible
explanation is that an alteration occurred in the structural
composition of the remaining U.S. experts and imports. This
proposition appears to be supported by the available infor-
mation. For example, increased energy costs, resulting pri-
marily from crude oil price increases, and the costs associ-
ated with compliance with environmental protection regula-
tions enacted by the government translate directly into in-
creased operating costs for domestic industries, and, conse-
quently, into lower corporate profits. This, combined with
diverse other factors, is reflected, in turn, in reduced do-
mestic industrial productivity, a modification in the nature
of industrial output in favor of those industries having a
comparative advantage in the international market place
(i.e., away from heavy industry and toward agriculture and
knowledge- and technology-intensive industries, such as the
computer, chemical, and armaments industries), and an over-
all decline in requirements for the material factors of pro-
duction, seen as a decline in imports of industrial supplies
and materials. At the same time, however, with the reduc-
tion and modification of domestic industrial production, the
resultant shortfall in fulfilling certain domestic consumer
demands must be offset through imports. The end result,
Lawrence R. Klein, "International Aspects of Industri-
al Policy," in Toward a Mew U.S. Industrial Policy? , eds.
Michael L. Waenter and Susan M. Wachter (Philadelphia: Uni-
versity of Pennsylvania Press, 1983), pp. 365-373.
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then, is a net increase in imports over exports-- that is,
a trade deficit.
The final major indicator to be- considered with re-
gard to the alteration of the United States' international
position during the post-World War II era involves the ero-
sion of its leadership role. The deterioration of the U.S.
position as the predominant nation in world affairs has been
a gradual, protracted, and, as yet, uncompleted process. A
multiplicity of causes have contributed to the process, and
both international and domestic factors have influenced its
scope and pace.
In the aftermath of World War II, the United States
assumed the role of world leader, particularly within the
non-communist world, where its dominance
. . . rested firmly on American military and economic
power, but even more so on the diplomatic and ideologi-
cal preeminence the United States enjoyed in the years
after 1945. 59
World War II left in its wake a physically, economically,
and emotionally devastated world. With the exception of the
United States, the populations, urban centers, industrial
plants, and economies of the principal belligerents had been
seriously disrupted or destroyed, leaving the U.S. as the
only major nation still possessing what could be termed
"normal" industrial and economic capabilities. The basis
59 . ...Richard Falk, "Lifting the Curse of Bipartisanship,"
World Policy Journal 1 (Fall 1983):128.
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for the emergence of the United States as the leading nation
in the postwar world, then, was this economic power, sup-
ported by the strength of existing U.S. military forces,
while positive direction was provided in the form of basic
American democratic ideals.
World War II has been regarded, in some respects, as
an ideological crusade. This was particularly true in Eu-
rope, where the war was perceived as a "struggle between the
60new 'dynamic' nations and the 'static' nations" of the
continent—that is, between fascism and liberal democracy.
When the United States entered the war, it brought with it a
set of principles and goals that generally coincided with
those of its Western European allies, and which served to
establish not only the ideological tenor of the war itself,
but also the manner in which the postwar world would be re-
built. First articulated publicly by President Franklin D.
Roosevelt in his annual message to the Congress (the famous
"Four Freedoms" speech) on January 6, 1941, and later in-
cluded in the Atlantic Charter, signed by President Roose-
velt and Prime Minister Winston Churchill of Great Britain
Leonard Mosley, Dulles: A Biography of Eleanor,
Allen, and John Foster Dulles and Their Family Network ( New
York: Dial Press, 1978), p. 90. See also, Sumner Welles,
The Time for Decision (New York: Harper & Bros., 1944).
ft 1
Disfavor directed toward communism (Marxism-Leninism)
,
initially included with fascism in the conflict dynamic, was
sublimated following the German invasion of the Soviet Union
in June 1941 and the Soviet entry into the war on the Allied
side, only to reemerge again after the war.
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on August 14, 1941, they encompassed national commitments
to: (1) refrain from executing any policies that would re-
sult in territorial or other aggrandizement; (2) respect and
insure the rights of conguered peoples to determine their
own forms of government free from external influence (i.e.,
the concept of self-determination and the policy of non-in-
terference); (3) endeavor, through international cooperation,
to further free trade and access to raw materials, and to
promote economic prosperity, "with the object of securing,
for all, improved labor standards, economic advancement and
social security" (i.e., freedom from want); (4) ensure
freedom of the high seas; and (5) secure and maintain a
lasting peace by preventing aggression, following the war,
through worldwide reductions in armaments and "the establish-
64
ment of a wider and permanent system of general security"
65(i.e., freedom from fear). There concepts and commitments
were incorporated into the proceedings of subseguent Allied
conferences (Casablanca, Moscow, Cairo, Teheran, and Yalta),
Concluded at a time when the U.S. was technically a
"non-belligerent" in the war, the Atlantic Charter consti-
tuted a statement of common war and peace aims. See John T
Flynn, The Roosevelt Myth (New York: Devin-Adair Co.,
1948), pp. 298-303.
Henry Steele Commager, ed. Documents of American





65 Ibid., pp. 446-449 and 451.
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becoming the cornerstone for Allied decisions concerning the
general conduct of the war and plans for postwar reconstruc-
tion, and providing the impetus for the eventual creation of
the United Nations. 66
Even before the end of the war, however, with an
Allied victory in Europe assured, the spirit of cooperation
that had existed among the Allies began to disintegrate.
Problems arising with the Soviet Union regarding reparations
from Germany and the operative definition of "self-determina-
tion," an apparent waning of Soviet enthusiasm for the
planned World Organization (the United Nations), and, par-
ticularly, Soviet activities aimed at consolidating its
position in Poland, Rumania, Bulgaria, and Czechoslovakia
before the war's end, and throughout Eastern Europe follow-
ing the surrender of Germany, led to the polarization of the
former Allies into two camps, with the Soviet Union on one
side and the United States, Great Britain, and France on the
other
.
Having survived the ordeal of war, the European na-
tions turned their attention to the immediate and complex
John Lewis Gaddis, The United States and the Origins
of the Cold War 1941-1947 (New York: Columbia University
Press, 1972), pp. 149-157.
Ibid., pp. 172, 174-175, and 198-224. See also, W.
Ave re 11 Karriman and Elie Abel, Special Envoy to Churchill
and Stalin 1941-1946 (New York: Random House, 1975) and
Winston S. Churchill, The Second World War: Triumph and
Tragedy (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Co., 1953).
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task of reconstruction. This monumental effort, complicated
by domestic considerations, questions dealing with the
treatment of the defeated Axis powers, and, later by the
division of Europe into western and Soviet spheres and the
onset of the Cold War, was pursued along three related paths
in Western Europe— initiatives providing for the reestab-
lishment and restructuring of domestic and European politi-
cal and economic stability and the establishment of safe-
guards to ensure the future security of the continent. Oc-
curring concurrently, and tending to support the process of
reconstruction, was a movement toward greater Western Euro-
pean unity, and, on a global scale, the related development
of the United Nations
.
The United States, recognizing the critical necessi-
ty of "
. . . the restoration of the economic life, the mo-
rale, and the political vigor and self-confidence of the Eu-
f) 8
ropean countries not under Soviet domination," provided
active support. With growing Cold War tensions, the origin-
al tacit acceptance of a Soviet sphere of influence in East-
ern Europe gave way, during the Truman Administration, to a
hardening of the U.S. position in support of the democratic
nations of Western Europe and in opposition to the Soviet
Union. Soviet actions in Eastern Europe, conflict between
68George F. Kennan, The Nuclear Delusion: Soviet-Ameri -




the western- allies and the Soviet Union over Berlin and the
reunification of Germany, the disruption of the postwar calm
caused by the Greek Givil War, western concern over the se-
curity of Greece and Turkey, and considerations pertaining
to the political and economic stability of Western Europe
elicited a succession of major U.S. and Western European
initiatives designed to check the Soviets and speed the re-
covery of Western Europe. The most significant of these,
from the American side, were the articulation of the Truman
Doctrine, in March 1947, providing U.S. economic and mili-
tary aid to nations threatened by communism, with specific
emphasis on aid to Greece and Turkey, and the institution of
the European Recovery Program (the Marshall Plan), in March
1948, providing assistance for the economic reconstruction
of Europe. For their part, the nations of Western Europe,
appreciating the necessity for political and economic recov-
ery, were, at the same time, concerned with the danger posed
by the emerging Soviet military superiority in Eastern and
Central Europe. Thus, while pursuing domestic recovery pro-
grams, they also addressed the reguirement for collective
security measures. This resulted in the development of the
Brussels Pact between Great Britain, France, Belgium, the
Netherlands, and Luxemburg, in March 1948, providing for ec-
onomic, social, and military cooperation between the mem-
bers. The creation of the Brussels Pact had been strongly
influenced by a communist coup in Czechoslovakia during
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February 1948, and this incident, combined with the Soviet
blockade of Berlin, commencing in July 1948, prompted the
establishment of the more comprehensive North Atlantic
Treaty Organization (NATO) in April 1949, and resulted in
the commitment of U.S. military power to the defense of
69Western Europe. This commitment took the form of both
conventional forces and a guarantee of nuclear protection
(the so-called U.S. "nuclear umbrella," initially consisting
only of strategic nuclear weapons, but, after 1958, also in-
cluding short-range, tactical weapons deployed to Western
Europe )
.
Since World War II, American foreign policy has been
intimately concerned with the Soviet Union—principal policy
goals have included combating the spread of communism and
71containing Soviet expansionism and influence --and with the
security of Western Europe. Although important diplomatic
and security arrangements have been concluded in other parts
of the world through multilateral and bilateral agreements
69Thomas W. Wolfe, Soviet Power and Europe 1945-1970
(Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Press, 1970), pp. 9-49. See
also, John Lewis Gaddis, Strategies of Containment: A
Critical Appraisal of Postwar American National Security
Policy (New York: Oxford University Press, 1982).
Michael-Mandelbaum, The Nuclear Revolution: Interna -
tional Politics Before and After Hiroshima (Mew York:
Cambridge University Press, 1981), p. 34. See also, Thomas
W. Wolfe, Soviet Power and Europe 1945-1970
, pp. 140-144.
71Kegley and Wittkopf, p. 36.
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(for example, membership in the United Nations after 1945;
the Rio Treaty [1947]; the Australia, New Zealand and United
States Treaty [ANZUS, 1951]; the Southeast Asia Treaty Or-
ganization [SEATO, 1955]; bilateral security agreements with
Japan [1951], the Philippines [1951], South Korea [1953],
and Taiwan [1955]; and support for, but not membership in,
the Baghdad Pact [1955] and its successor, the Central
Treaty Organization [CENTO, 1959], although bilateral agree-
ments were made with member nations Turkey, Pakistan, and
72Iran [1959]), NATO and Western Europe have remained at the
center of American diplomatic and military policies. They
also constitute two of the three major areas in which the
deterioration of U.S. leadership is apparent.
The principal strength as well as one of the major
weaknesses of the American position in Europe has been the
U.S. commitment to the security of its NATO allies. While
the U.S. security guarantee provides a binding force, it has
also been a source of friction. Almost from the inception
of the North Atlantic Alliance, the United States has voiced
periodic concern over the comparative size and expense of
its commitment--generally during periods of sluggish U.S.
72 By 1982, however, only five of these agreements re-
mained in effect (excluding the U.N.): the Rio Pact, the
ANZUS Pact, and the bilateral agreements with Japan, South
Korea, and the Philippines. See Lawrence J. Korb, "The
Defense Policy of the United States," in The Defense Poli -
cies of Nations: A Comparative Study , eds . Douglas J. Mur-
ray and Paul R. Viotti (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University
Press, 1982), pp. 55-57.
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domestic economic conditions—and complaints that its allies
have failed to assume a proportionate share of the responsi-




The Western European nations, in turn, have tended
to view their security position as a derivative of the
larger struggle between the United States and the Soviet
Union, and have voiced concern regarding U.S. views support-
ing the utility of military forces, and fear that while
the U.S. may provide them with nuclear protection, it is
Western Europe that will be the most likely battlefield
75should war break out between the superpowers. They have
also perceived that the U.S. commitment may not be total—or
sincere. They point to U.S. reductions in its NATO force
levels during the Korean and Vietnam Wars as evidence of the
possibility that American commitments elsewhere in the world
may have priority over European security considerations in
the future. Additionally, some have voiced concern over
the potential for the effective loss of national autonomy,
perceiving that their security is dictated by the United
73Laurence Radway, "Let Europe Be Europe," World Policy
Journal 1 (Fall 1983):26.
74 ...Eliot A. Cohen, "The Long-Term Crisis of the Alliance,"
Foreign Affairs 61 (Winter 1982-83 ): 332-334
.
75Karl Kaiser et al. , "Nuclear Weapons and the Preser-
vation of Peace," Foreign Affairs 60 (Summer 1982): 1161-
1165.
Cohen, pp. 335-3 37.
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States and 'that they may become involved, against their
wrlls, in future conflicts outside Europe as a result of
their association with the U.S. in NATO. These latter con-
siderations strongly influenced the decision of France's
President Charles de Gaulle to withdraw French military
forces from NATO in 1966.
Other fissures, not strictly associated with the
Atlantic Alliance but having an impact on it, have also
appeared in American relations with Western Europe. These
have been, in part, perceptual differences and may be illus-
trated by examples from three broad areas. First is the Eu-
ropean perception of a U.S. tendency toward unilateralism,
seen in, among other things, the partial U.S. embargo of
American grain shipments to the Soviet Union, imposed during
7 R1980 in response to the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan;
U.S. trade sanctions directed against Poland in response to
the imposition of martial law in that country in December
1981; and sanctions placed on the delivery of equipment and
associated technology by U.S. companies and their European
Jean Klein, "France, NATO, and European Security,"
International Security 2 (Winter 1977):24-30. See also,
Henry A. Kissinger, ?he Troubled Partnership; A Re-apprais -
al of the Atlantic Alliance (New York: McGraw-Hill Book
Co., 1965;, pp. 31-64.
7 8
A certain duality of American purpose was perceived by
the Europeans when the U.S. later lifted the embargo, under
pressure from American grain farmers, while maintaining its
Polish and pipeline sanctions—actions that were more dam-
aging economically to Western Europe than to the U.S.
96

subsidiaries for the construction of the Soviet Euro-Siberi-
in natural gas pipeline, again, in response to Poll all ilia. j. —
79
tial law and the Afghanistan invasion. Second, "America's
freewheeling monetary policy and an undervalued dollar" were
attacked as contributors to European economic difficulties
during the late 1970s, and "throughout 1982, the Europeans
. . . never ceased to attack exorbitant American interest
rates and the overvalued American dollar as prime threats to
O Qglobal [economic] recovery." Also contributing to econom-
ic differences and supporting the perception of U.S. unilat-
eralism were U.S. trade protection policies (primarily those
providing protection for the U.S. steel and agricultural in-
dustries) and veiled U.S. threats, made in late 1982, to
"dump" its surplus agricultural products on the world mar-
8 1ker . ~ And, finally, the Western European perception of
detente and the Soviet threat has differed, in recent years,
from that of the United States. While Soviet and Cuban ac-
tivities in Angola, the invasion of Afghanistan, and the ex-
pansion of the Soviet military have been viewed as threaten-
ing and have signaled the end of detente for the U.S., the
79Andrew Knight, "Ronald Reagan's Watershed Year?" For -
eign Affairs 61:3 ("America and the World 1982 "): 519-520
.
80Josef Joffe, "Europe and America: The Politics of Re-





Europeans have perceived the Soviet threat as less pro-
nounced and have continued to maintain generally good diplo-
matic ana commercial relations with the Soviet: Union and the
Eastern Bloc.
The final major area in which the effectiveness of
American leadership may be seen to have diminished is the
general category of global relations. Several factors have
contributed to this condition. First, although its economy
remains the largest in the world, in terms of gross national
product, and its military forces are second only to those of
the Soviet Union in size, the relative deterioration of U.S.
economic and military strength since World War II have un-
dermined the foundation upon which the American leadership
position was constructed. Second, the United States no
longer retains an undisputed moral and ideological leader-
ship role among the world's non-communist nations. The ab-
sence of national consensus in the wake of the Vietnam War
and Watergate has been perceived as weakness and as a lack
of resolve and direction by America's friends and adversar-
ies alike--a perception heightened and sustained by such na-
tional failures as the apparent inability of the United
States to respond in an early and positive manner to the
seizure of more than fifty American citizens by a compara-
tively weak Iranian government in 1979, and, then, once a
82 Seweryn Bialer and Joan Afrerica, "Reagan and Russia,"




course of action had been decided upon, the failure of the
U.S. attempt no rescue the hostages in April 1980. Third,
the fragmentation of the international forum occurring with
the emergence of large numbers of newly independent nations
during the post-World War II breakdown on the colonial em-
pires, and the subsequent emergence of the so-called non-
aligned bloc of nations have resulted in a diffusion of U.S,
global influence. The strength of the non-aligned nations
as a voting bloc in the United Nations and other interna-
tional organizations, in particular, has increased the dif-
ficulty faced by the United States in consolidating support
for its initiatives in international negotiations. And,
finally, American veracity and credibility no longer go un-
questioned. Within the Third and Fourth Worlds, in particu-
lar, the United States is perceived, variously, as a sup-
porter of dictatorships, a neo-colonial or neo-imperialist
power, and a status quo power bent on maintaining its posi-
tion as a superpower, making it, in their view, a nation
that is not to be trusted.
The net result of the various diplomatic, economic,
and military factors, when taken within the overall context
of existing international and domestic conditions, has been
a gradual--but very real--weakening of the U.S. position
relative to other nations and groups of nations in the
world. The exploitation by other nations—particularly the
Soviet Union--of the ideological and diplomatic capital
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realized from U.S. weaknesses has increased not only the
difficulty but also the risks associated with the achieve-
ment of American goals in the international forum, and, in
so doing, contributes to the further deterioration of the
U.S. position. Perceptions of U.S. weaknesses and the man-
ner in which they are exploited by others represent genuine
constraints on the freedom of American activity, and, when
considered along with other general international and domes-
tic conditions, constitute the fabric of the context within
which the United States must exist, function, and react. A
dynamic results in which these perceptions influence the de-
cisions of American policymakers, structure the nature of
the decisions made and the policies implemented, and provide
the backdrop against which the effectiveness--or inadequacy
--of decisions and policies are measured. To a greater or
lesser degree, this dynamic is operative in all facets of
domestic and foreign policy, but is nowhere as significant




IV. NATIONAL SECURITY: THREAT, CONFLICT
AND MOBILIZATION
The "technological revolution" has tended to complicate
the already complex milieu of international relations.
Whether technological advances—particularly the development
of weapons of mass destruction—are viewed as revolutionary,
implying a complete or marked change in previously existing
conditions, or merely evolutionary, implying developmental
or progressive change, they have influenced the structure
and dynamism of the international context. They have not,
however, modified the underlying motivating factors or the
basic strategic considerations of international actors.
With the advance of technology in recent years, "time
and space have been telescoped," and the sophistication
and destructive potential of modern weapons have expanded by
an order of magnitude. The result has been an increase not
only in the rapidity with which events occur--with a com-
mensurate reduction in available reaction time--but also in
the potential for inflicting unacceptable damage on an ad-
versary, and, conseugently , in the risks associated with a
failure to respond adeguately--measured in terms of both
time and intensity. The traditional mechanisms employed by
Hanson W. Baldwin, Strategy for Tomorrow (New York:
Harper & Row, 1970), p. 85.
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nations in international relations remain unchanged, however,
in their essential characteristics, a-lthough their form of
expression has been altered, becoming increasingly mere com-
plex and subtle in their articulation.
The specific interests and aspirations of international
actors, notwithstanding, the existence and perception of
power and its employment remain the central aspects of ac-
84tivities among nations. Power may be defined as " . . . the
capacity of a nation to use its tangible and intangible re-
sources in such a way as to affect the behavior of other na-
o c
tions." That is, power involves the ability of a nation
to influence the actions of other nations--to forestall ac-
tivities that would negate the achievement of its own goals,
or. to produce activity by other nations that would support
the achievement of such goals. The potential power of a na-
tion depends upon the aggregate guantity and guality of the
determinants of powers that it possesses— its economic and
industrial strength, natural resources, geostrategic posi-
tion, military strength, diplomatic strength, national char-
acter, and so forth. The actual power of a nation, on the
other hand, is contingent upon the relative balance existing
84Robert E. Osgood and Robert W. Tucker, Force, Order,
and Justice (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Press, 1967), pp. 4-
14 passim.
John G. Stoessinger, The Might of Nations: World




between its potential power and that of other nations, the
perceptions held by other nations of its power, and the em-




One of the primary national objectives of any nation is
generally recognized to be the survival of the state as a
sovereign entity, measured in terms of the preservation of
its cultural identity, political and social systems, terri-
er -7
torial integrity, and economic well-being. This charac-
teristic predisposition toward national survival is clearly
reflected in efforts undertaken to ensure that an adeguate
level of national security is provided during peacetime, and
is one of the predominant forces, as an instrument of moti-
vation and legitimization, when the nation prepares for, or
when it actually engages in, armed conflict.
8 6
The most important scholar in the field addressing the
potential and actual power of nations is Klaus Knorr. For
additional information on this subject, see his books, The
War Potential of Nations (Princeton, NJ : Princeton Uni-
versity Press, 1956); he Uses of Military Power in the
Nuclear Age (Princeton, NJ : Princeton University Press,
1960); Military Power and Potential (Princeton, NJ : Prince-
ton University Press, 1970); and Power and Wealth: The




The concept of survival as a prime motive of nations
is addressed in the following sources, among others: the
above works by Klaus Knorr; Waltz, Theory of International
Politics ; Morgenthau, Politics Among Nations ; Stoessinger,
The Might of Nations ; and W. W. Rostow, The Diffusion of
Power (Mew York: Macmillan Co., 1972).
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If it is accepted that national security "... signi-
fies protection of the nation's people and territories
against physical assault," the implied "... protection
. . .
of vital economic and political interests, the loss of
which could threaten fundamental values and the vitality of
O Q
the state," and "measures taken ... to safeguard inter-
ests against any kind of inimical influence, foreign or do-
89 .
mestic," including the provision of a strong economy and
social system and viable national institutions, in addition
to a strong military capability, a type of international
political Darwinism may be postulated to exist. Withi this
construct, the "fittest" nations— that is, those that pro-
vide adguate security for themselves, either directly, or
indirectly through alliance with or receipt of protection
from other nations, or through a combination of both direct
and indirect measures—continue to survive in the interna-
90 . . .tional arena. The specific motivational factors and the
nature and methods of national security programs vary,
Jordan and Taylor, American National Security
, p. 3
89 . ...John M. Collins, U.S. Defense Planning: A Critique
(Boulder, Co.: Westview Press, 1982), p. 309.
90 ...Examples of nations whose failure to maintain adquate
national security resulted in their ceasing to be truly
sovereign nations are provided by Poland and Czechoslovakia
among others. Excellent examples of the opposite extreme,
displaying the effects of preparedness and national resolve
in the face of aggression, are provided by the actions of
Finland during the Winter War with the Soviet Union in 1939
and 1940, and by Great Britain during World War II.
104

however, from nation to nation, and, within an individual
nation, are dynamic over time. For example, although the
end objective of national survival may be identical, the
security requirements of superpower states, such as the
United States and the Soviet Union, may be seen to be far
different, both in scope and intensity, from those of less
powerful nations. Further, the composition of initiatives
undertaken to provide national security is variable and must
balance existing and projected capabilities against per-
ceived and actual threats to security within the uncertain
context of international relations. Thus, a nation must be
able to adapt to fundamental changes in the international
order, to changes resulting from institutional and cultural
91
evolution, and to technological changes. Ultimately, how-
ever, whether or not a nation survives in time of war de-
pends largely upon the resolution of its people and the
preparations it makes in peacetime for the eventuality of
war
.
The national security posture of the United States is,
in general, guided by the impetus of the American strategic
culture and structured by the availability and commitment of
national resources. Dictated by these conditioning factors,
91An excellent discussion of "cultural adaptation" and
the effects of "cultural misadaptation" on national security
in contemporary America is provided in Thomas P. Rona , Our





it has historically been—and continues to be—essentially
92derensive in nature. This posture, based on preparation
for what Western moral and ethical tradition terms a "just
93 •
war," is characterized by the dual requirements that na-
tional defense policies be "appropriate" and that they not
exceed the bounds of "sufficiency." Thus, while the Ameri-
can people can accept the existence of defense policies and
military forces designed to ultimately ensure the continua-
tion of the nation, they cannot--and will not, for long—tol-
erate the development and employment of military power for
purposes other than legitimate self-defense (i.e., defense
against "unjust" aggression). The resultant defense ethic,
then, becomes one mandating that the United States never
strike the. first blow in war; that it possess sufficient
military power to deter war; that its military strength be
sufficient to fight a war, in the near-term, should deter-
rence fail; and that it maintain the requisite capability,
during peacetime, to mobilize its industry and population
to fight and win a war against an aggressor, in the long-
term, should that course of action become necessary to
guarantee national survival.
92U.S., Department of Defense, Annual Report to the
onqress, Fiscal Year 1984
, p. 32.
93 ...
For a detailed examination of the "just war" tradition
and related topics, see National Conference of Catholic
Bishops, The Challenge to Peace: God's Promise and Our
Response [Pastoral Letter], 3rd draft (n.p. : United States
Catholic Conference, 1983), pp. 40-53.
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The American defense ethic--m the above form—is a
post-World War II condition, reflecting fundamental altera-
tions in the articulation of national security policy. From
the Revolutionary War until World War II, U.S. security
policy effectively amounted to the pursuit of a posture of
isolationism and reliance on a traditional strategy of con-
94tmental defense. Prejudiced against "standing armies as
95
a dangerous menace to liberty," having no powerful nations
on its borders, and being separated from the powerful na-
tions of Europe by the Atlantic Ocean, the comparatively
weak American republic maintained only a small military es-
tablishment. This professional cadre was considered suffi-
cient to meet peacetime security needs, while the inherent
protection provided by the nation's insular geographic posi-
tion allowed time for the expansion of the personnel and
96
material strength of the armed forces when war was imminent.
94Russell F. Weigley, The American Way of War; A His -
orv of United States Military Strategy and Police (New
York: Macmillan Publishing Co., 1973), p. 169.
95 ...Emory Upton, 'he Military Policy of the United States
(Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1917), p. ix,
96 .U.S., Library of Congress, Legislative Reference Ser-
vice, United States Defense Policies Since World War II
,
prepared at the reguest of the Honorable Melvin Price, Mem-
ber of Congress (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Of-
fice, 1957), p. 59. See also, Richard Smoke, "The Evolution
of American Defense Policy," in American Defense Policy , 5th
ed., eds. John F. Reichart and Steven R. Sturm (Baltimore:
Johns Hopkins University Press, 1982), p. 97; and Theodore W
Bauer and Eston T. White, National Security Policy Formula -





Thus, in the years immediately preceding World War II,
. . . American strategy implicitly assumed that the
geographical remoteness of the United States from other
powers, the superiority of the American fleet in west-
ern hemisphere waters, and the struggles which must en-
sue on the Eurasian continent before the balance of
power there could be upset, all would give the United
States sufficient time in a crisis to convert its man-
power and industrial potential into operational mili-
tary strength. 9'
World War II and its aftermath, with the destruction of
the prewar power structure in Europe and Asia and the sub-
sequent emergence of the United States as the leading nation
in world affairs, removed most of the factors upon which
America's traditional security posture was based. The bene-
fits of geography were largely nullified by technological
advances m weaponry, transportation, and communications,
and the policy of isolationism ceased to be a viable option.
Additionally, with the postwar adoption of a policy of col-
lective security and its associated strategy of deterrence,
the existence of forces-in-being assumed a much greater
level of importance, while reliance on mobilization poten-
99 . .tial was reduced --but not eliminated.
Deterrence has remained the central concept of American
national security policy since World War II. During the
97Samuel P. Huntington, The Common Defense: Strategic
Programs in National Politics (New York: Columbia Universi-
ty Press, 1961), p. 26.




intervening years, its purpose (the promotion of interna-
x. -u • i • x. 100 s , ,tional suability ) has remained unchanged, out its articu-
lation and perceptions of the possible consequences of its
failure have. The dual beliefs, prevalent in the early
postwar years, that when deterrence fails, escalation to
total nuclear war is inevitable, and that nuclear war, once
initiated, will be of short duration, have yielded to the
consideration of other possibilities. The occurrence of a
large number of limited, conventional conflicts since World
War II--for example, the Korean and Vietnam Wars and several
Arab-Israeli conf licts--and the potential for the effective
management of crises, have indicated that the escalation
of conflict to the nuclear level need not be a foregone con-
clusion and that war may still entail a protracted effort.
And, with this realization that future armed conflict may
span a range from a level involving the limited use of con-
ventional forces--to achieve limited political or military
goals--to the level of total nuclear war, the maintenance of
a viable mobilization potential in-being and the utility of
national mobilization have once again assumed a vital role
in national security considerations.
100John Lewis Gaddis, Russia, the Soviet Union, and the
United States: An Interpretive History (New York: John
Wiley 6c Sons, 1978), pp. 198-200.
Craig and George, Force and Statecraft , pp. 205-219.
See also, Alexander L. George, Managing U.S. -Soviet Rivalry:





B. THREAT AND ITS USE
One of the principal means for the articulation of na-
tional power in international relations is through the em-
102 , . . .ployment of tnreat . An intuitively simple but operation-
ally complex concept, threat encompasses a wide range of at-
tributes, as shown in Table 19. The statement of a threat
carries with it a delimitation of acceptable or desired ac-
tivity by an adversary and a declaration--actual or per-
ceived--of an intention or resolution to inflict punishment
on him in retaliation for the occurrence of, or conditional-
ly on the continuation of, a proscribed activity. The sole
object of a threat is to influence the actions of the adver-
103 .
sary, and, as such, it constitutes a means to an end, but
not an end in itself.
A threat may be of one of two types--one that attempts
to deter or discourage an adversary from undertaking an un-
desired activity, or one that attempts to compel or force
him to cease an undesired activity in which he is engaged.
102
It may be argued that national power is articulated
by the simple fact of its existence. This is acceptable,
however, in only one instance--when power is passive, that
is, when the existence or possession of power is a goal.
Power may also constitute a means or instrument for the
achievement of other goals, and from this perspective, it
connotes an active role in which an inclination toward the
use of threat to achieve the desired goals is implied--and
,
conversely, the protection of the goals from threat by other
nations
.
103Thomas C. Schelling, Arms and Influence (New Haven,
Ct . : Yale University Press, 1966), pp. 69-80 passim.
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Threats of the first type are generally referred to collec-
tively as "deterrence." They have as their purpose the pre-
vention of an undesired action by an adversary (that is, the























































































































TABLE 19. THREAT CLASSIFICATION
target of the threat). This is accomplished by declaring an
intent and demonstrating a resolve to respond to the adver-
sary's initiation of an undesirable action by inflicting a
level of damage that will be unacceptable to him. Thus, de-
terrence is essentially passive in nature and is not limited
by considerations of rime. Once made, the deterrent threat
111

may lie dormant for an indefinite period. If and when the
adversary commences the proscribed activity, at some future
point in time, the declard intent of the threat is then exe-
cuted. Deterrence, then, may require a long-term commit-
ment, and for the threat to be effective, it must be credi-
ble. That is, the target of the threat must perceive that
the threat initiator has both the capability and the resolve
104
necessary to make good its declared intention.
The second type of threat has been termed "compellence .
"
It differs from deterrence in two basic respects. First,
the purpose of compellence is to force the target nation to
stop or modify the form of an activity in which it is en-
gaged. This is accomplished by initiating a counter-activi-
ty that has the potential for causing greater damage to the
adversary than may be compensated for by the expected gains
derived from the continuation of his activity. Thus, it
contains the element of coercion. Additionally, compellence
may carry with it a positive reinforcement in the form of a
declared or implied assurance that the damaging counter-ac-
tivity undertaken by the threat initiator will be terminated
when the adversary's objectionable activity ceases. Second,
a compellent threat is time dependent, in that it requires
the nation declaring the threat to initiate the counter-ac-





threat is active in nature, and, as with deterrence, re-
quires that it be perceived as credible by the target nation
i 05in order to be erfective.
Threats, whether deterrent or compellent, may be target-
ed against an individual nation or a group of nations, and
they may have limited or wide-ranging goals. They may be
designed to influence general behavior, as with nuclear de-
terrence, behavior within a specific area of activity (i.e.,
the economic, diplomatic, or military area), or behavior
within a specific context (e.g., U.S. trade sanctions—
a
form of compellence--imposed following the Soviet invasion
of Afghanistan) . The level or intensity of threats and
their duration are variable, being directly related to the
nature of the desired effect on the target nation and the
speed with which realization of the effect is sought. And,
finally, deterrent threats, although normally initiated in-
tentionally, may also occur incidentally with equal ef-
fect—that is, a threat may be perceived where none was in-
tended .
The effect of a threat on the target nation is a matter
of degree, being dependent upon the nation's sensitivity and
vulnerability to the particular type of threat made.
105 Ibid. See also, Osgood and Tucker, p. 186; and
Waltz, p. 189.
Compellence cannot occur incidentally, since, by
definition, a compellent threat requires the threatening
nation to initiate overt action against the target nation
113

Sensitivity is the degree to which a nation is susceptible
to costly or damaging effects imposed by external influences,
assuming the nation's policies are not altered in an attempt
to improve its situation. Vulnerability is a measure of the
nation's susceptibility to " . . . costs imposed by external
• 107
events even arter policies have been altered." Sen cr -.
tivity and vulnerability are similar concepts, differing
principally in terms of relative susceptibility, the nation-
al context effected, and the factor of time. A nation may
be very sensitive to the effects of a specific external
event, but may be relatively less vulnerable to the same
event. Additionally, the nation's sensitivity and vulnera-
bility to the event may change over time--presumably de-
creasing--with the implementation of new or altered pcli-
108
cies. For example, the United States is currently very
sensitive to the disruption of supplies of certain critical
and strategic minerals from foreign sources. It is also
vulnerable to supply disruption. But, because of its stock-
piles of minerals, it is relatively less vulnerable than if
no stockpiles were maintained. And, if mineral supplies
were disrupted, the vulnerability could potentially be re-
duced over time by acguiring the necessary minerals through
deep seabed mining and the mining of domestic reserves not
Keohane and Nye, pp. 12-13
108 Ibid., pp. 12-17.
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currently exploited because of economic infeasibility , and
by extending existing mineral supplies through recycling,
rationing, and the substitution of abundant minerals for
scarce ones, where possible.
Threats must be assessed individually, but they cannot
--or should not--be assessed in isolation. Each threat must
be analyzed within the context of existing international and
domestic conditions, present and future national goals, and
current and projected resources and capabilities. All po-
tential conseguences of the threat must be considered and a
balance achieved between expectations and available means in
order to minimize the adverse impact of the threat on the
nation and its interests.
C. CONFLICT
Conflict, in international relations, implies the exist-
ence of a state of difference or opposition between the
principles or interests of two or more nations or groups of
nations. As with threat, conflict is not an end in itself,
and is employed as an instrument for achieving a desired
goal
.
Two broad categories of conflict may be seen to exist.
The first includes the various forms of non-violent con-
flict. Conflict within this category involves opposition
109Lee Calaway and W. C. J. van Rensburg, "US Strategic
Minerals: Policy Options," Resources Police (June 1982): 97
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between the principles and interests of nations associated
with the non-violent aspects of international relations
(i.e., ideology, economics, and diplomacy). These types of
conflict represent the lower end of the conflict spectrum,
and, although they may vary individually in intensity, they
are essentially neutral or passive in nature. By them-
selves, they cannot produce a modifying influence on the ac-
tions of the nations involved, but when articulated through
the employment of threat or in conjunction with conflict
from the second category, they have the potential capability
of doing so.
Conflict within the second category includes opposition
that is violent, and thus active, in nature. These types of
conflict can, by themselves, influence the actions of the
nations involved. Representing the upper end of the con-
flict spectrum, they entail the application of force--that
is, a demonstration of intent to use or the actual employ-
ment of the nations' military capabilities.
Violent conflict varies over a wide range of character-
istics and intensity, with the variation demonstrated in the
type of confrontation or combat in which the nations are en-
gaged and the severity of potential damage to the belliger-
ents. In this regard, violent conflict may be subdivided
into three levels. The first and lowest level is that of
sub-crisis, bordering on non-violent conflict and involving
the posturing of military forces, but with a comparatively
116

low possibility of hostilities occurring. Next is the
crisis level, entailing confrontation between opposing mili-
tary forces and an increased probability of hostilities.
Finally, at the uppermost end of the conflict spectrum, is
the level of warfare, at which hostilities between military
forces are initiated and continue with or without a formal
declaration of war. The warfare level may, in turn, be di-
vided between conventional (i.e., non-nuclear) and nuclear
warfare, each of which may be further subdivided into a low-
er level--limited war--and an upper level--general or total
110
war.
Considerations of the specific motivations, aims, and
strategies associated with the various categories of con-
flict aside, the progression of conflict from the lower
levels of non-violence to violence and warfare entails in-
creasing levels of physical as well as psychological threat
to the nation and its interests from external sources. It
also implies the requirement for increasing levels of na-
tional commitment, supported by commensurate national
Robert E. Osgood, "Limited War and Power Projection,"
in American Defense Policy , 5th ed . , eds . John F. Reichart
and Steven R. Sturm ( Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University
Press, 1982), p. 375, notes that limited war is "fought for
ends far short of the complete subordination of one state's
will to another's, using means that involve far less than
the total military resources of the belligerents and leave
the civilian life and the armed forces of the belligerents
largely intact." By way of contrast, "in total war," ac-
cording to Craig and George, pp. 220-221, "each side strives




resolve. Within the context of international threat and
conflict, national security—the survival of the nation—re-
mains the principal concern of the nation. Supporting the
attainment and perpetuation of this fundamental national
interest are efforts undertaken to reduce the vulnerability
of the nation to the influences of other nations and to
maximize the nation's potential to withstand threats to the
component areas of national endeavor--that is, to its so-
ciety, economy, and the continuation of its diplomatic and
military activities. This purpose, in turn, is served by
the development and maintenance of national power within
each of its subsumed categories. One mechanism available
for the achievement of this latter purpose is the mainten-
ance of a viabla capability to mobilize the components of
power in times of national need.
D. MOBILIZATION: AN OVERVIEW
In its broadest sense, mobilization implies a state of
national readiness. It involves those actions and processes
implemented by the national leadership to bring to bear the
level of national potential commensurate with a perceived or
actual threat to national security. A mobilization effort
may be undertaken either in peacetime to prepare the nation
for war, or in wartime to support the nation's war effort.
And, mobilization is normally undertaken in conjunction with






The mobilization process addresses four broad, in-
terrelated classes of actions:
(1) Industrial mobilization;
(2) Military mobilization;
(3) Civil defense; and
(4) The establishment and maintenance of alliances.
Within each broad category are a variety of specific poten-
tial initiatives and requirements that support the overall
process. The number and character of these that are imple-
mented will be determined by the desired level of mobiliza-
tion effort (i.e., limited, partial, full, or total) decided
upon by the national leaders, and the intensity of the mobi-
lization effort, in turn, will be dictated by the level of
the potential or actual conflict.
a. Industrial Mobilization
Industrial mobilization has as its purpose the
provision of the necessary material resources for war. In
its execution, it includes two related types of activity.
The first, undertaken in peacetime, and continued and ex-
panded in wartime, is the development and maintenance of an
industrial mobilization (or industrial production) base,
providing the defense industry with the "ability ... to
respond rapidly to increased demand for production outputs
Foster and Hoeber, pp. 448-449
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112in times or national emergency" --that is, with a "surge
113 ...
. .
capability." Included within this area are such specific
initiatives as the stockpiling of materials (raw materials
as well as fabricated materials, or war reserve materials,
including spare parts, subassemblies, and complete systems),
ensuring that requisite production capabilities exist (e.g.,
production machinery and skilled manpower), the maintenance
of necessary production capabilities through, for example,
the construction of standby production lines and plants and
114 . .
"trickle production," and the provision of enabling leg-
islation supporting the maintenance of production capabili-
ties in peacetime, and providing the statutory means for
11 ?Gansler, ?he Defense Industry
, p. 109.
113 . . . .
"Surge capability" addresses the potential of indus-
try to meet increased production demands and is associated
with "D-to-P" calculations. Lawrence J. Korb, "A New Look
at U.S. Defense Industrial Preparedness," in Industrial
Capacity and Defense Planning: Sustained Conflict and Surge
Capability in the 1980s , eds . Lee D. Olvey, Henry A. Leonard,
and Bruce E. Arlinghaus (Lexington, Ma.: Lexington Books,
1983), pp. 32-33 n. 1, states that "'D-to-P' refers to a
planning concept that computes the quantity of war reserves
. . . that must be in inventory on D-day to fill the gap be-
tween the wartime-consumption rate and the production rate,
out to the time (P-day) when the production rate could be
expanded to match or exceed the consumption rate."
114
"Trickle production" involves the manufacture and
procurement of components and systems over an extended peri-
od rather than at a single point in time. This procedure is
designed to maintain required production capabilities, but,
at the same time, entails increased overhead costs to the
manufacturer. These increased costs are passed on to the
government in the form of higher unit prices. Thus, while
the procedure assists in maintaining production capabili-





their expansion when that course of action becomes necessary
115in preparation for war.
The second type of activity involves the actual
mobilization of industry. This is normally initiated when
the likelihood of war becomes apparent and continues during
wartime. Included within this area are actions such as the
establishment of production requirements (for both military
and civilian purposes), the establishment of priorities, and
the establishment and implementation of controls (e.g., con-
trols on the allocation and distribution of materials, out-
put quotas and limitations, consumer rationing, credit con-
trols, and so forth).
b. Military Mobilization
The purpose of military mobilization is the
provision of the necessary human resources for war, and, by
extension, the associated equipment and supplies required.
As with industrial mobilization, military mobilization has
both peacetime and wartime components. During peacetime,
the intent is to maintain sufficient levels of manpower and
materiel, in active as well as reserve forces, to furnish a
credible initial restraint on the actions of a potential ad-
versary--that is, to act as a deterrent and to limit his
gains once hostilities have commenced. This intention




influences the size of standing forces and may be supported
by the existence of, or plans for, other mechanisms designed
co increase the personnel levels and efficiency of the mili-
tary forces. These include, among other things, provisions
for the call-up of reserve forces, recall of inactive or re-
tired personnel to active duty, conscription, and training
programs. Also included among the peacetime initiatives is
the development and maintenance of a viable capability for
the transportation of men and materiel to the location of
hostilities and sustaining them once there. This encompas-
ses, but is not restrict to, the development and continued
maintenance of personnel and equipment support organiza-
tions; airlift and sealift forces; domestic highway, rail,
and air systems to facilitate the movement of men and mate-
riel to points of embarkation for overseas deployment, and
contingency plans supporting the employment of the means of
transport and supply. Other peacetime initiatives may in-
clude increased defense appropriations and procurement for
the purpose of increasing the levels of available war re-
serve materiel and promoting a wider range of research and
development (R&D) efforts.
Wartime military mobilization differs from that
of peacetime as a matter of degree and urgency. With the
U.S., Department of Defense, Master Mobilization Plan
( MMP
)
(Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1982),
pp. 19-27. See also, Foster and Hoeber, p. 448.
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initiation of hostilities, existing mechanisms are expanded
and contingency plans executed in order to convert potential
military strength into strength in-being. Those initiatives
designed to increase the personnel strength and support
capabilities of the military and provide a continuing supply
of men and materiel, if not previously pursued, will be
undertaken at this time.
c. Civil Defense
Civil defense has the dual purposes of protec-
tion and restoration—that is, the protection of the civil-
ian population and domestic industry and utilities against
the physical effects of war (or, as a minimum, reducing the
effects) and the recovery of the population, industry, and
utilities after the occurrence of war damage. The role of
protection may include plans for or the implementation of
such damage limiting initiatives as population sheltering;
the hardening of domestic industrial, utility, and military
facilities? the physical dispersal of the locations of in-
dustry and utilities; the evacuation of civilian population
centers; and the safeguarding of the civil and military
leadership and their means of command and control. Support-
ing the recovery function may be plans and existing capa-
bilities for the restoration of industry and utilities; the
repair of damage; decontamination, in instances where nucle-
ar, biological, or chemical (NBC) weapons have been employed;
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the repopulation of urban centers, if they had previously
been evacuated; and the provision of emergency health, medi-
cal, and support services, including the provision of food
and shelter.
d. Alliances
Alliances have the potential for providing a
source of strength in peacetime and increasing available
resources and capabilities in wartime. Active leadership
and diplomacy are the key elements in realizing this poten-
tial. The establishment of regional power groupings and
agreements between nations having a commonality in priori-
ties, goals, and operational structures (e.g., logistics
systems; command, control, communications, and intelligence
[C3I] systems; and military forces) yield a greater poten-
tial for deterring the outbreak of war, and a potentially
greater level of strength, through collective effort, in
wartime and ror war termination.
2 . Economic Considerations of Mobilization
Mobilization constitutes a fundamental alteration of
the normal operation of the nation and the national economy.
I 1 o
Foster and Hoeber, p. 449. See also, Charles J.
Hitch and Roland N. McKean, The Economics of Defense in the
iuclear Age (New York: Atheneum, 1960), pp. 323-333; and
Bernard Brodie, Strategy in the Missile Age (Princeton, NJ
:
Princeton University Press, 1965), pp. 210-216.
119Foster and Hoeber, p. 449.
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During peacetime, the economy is generally concerned with
the allocation of scarce resources and capital in a manner
designed to maximize consumer satisfaction. This goal is
significantly changed, however, when the nation mobilizes,
with the emphasis shifting to the production of more war
materiel and less consumer products. That is, given the
prime objective of establishing the capability for, or actu-
ally prosecuting and winning a war, consumer satisfaction
becomes a secondary consideration, and civilian consumption
is reduced through both voluntary and regulatory action,
while the maximum possible amount of resources are allocated
.
. 120
or diverted to the military sector.
The transition from a normal consumer economy to a
mobilization economy is generally recognized as proceeding
in three stages. The first, officially designated as the
"mobilization hump," involves "... the shifting of the
economic system from normal peacetime pursuits to the pro-
duction of a greatly increased guantity of war eguipment,
and the expansion of productive capacity suitable to the
production of war eguipment." Within the second, or "mobi-
lization readiness," stage, the "... country is prepared
in terms of men under arms, military eguipment, the stock-
piling of critical materials, reserve capacity for the pro-
duction of military goods, and basic industrial capacity to
120 . .
w. Glenn Campbell, ed. , Economics or Mobilization and
War (Homewood, II.: Richard D. Irwin, 1952), p. 3.
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wage war on short notice." The third and final stage is
121
"total war . "
During the transition period to a mobilization
economy, and while the mobilization plan remains in effect,
a fundamental conflict may be expected between the require-
ments to maintain the civilian living standard at an ac-
ceptable level and to provide the greatest possible amount
of goods and services for military use. The national econ-
omic policy is the mechanism that seeks to reduce the level
of this conflict. The ability of the nation to avoid poten-
tial pitfalls and achieve the goals of the economic policy
will largely determine the ease with which the transition
phase is completed and the overall success of the mobiliza-
tion effort.
The national economic policy interacts with all fac-
ets of the mobilization plan, and, in so doing, attempts to
maximize supply, facilitate the conversion of selected in-
dustries to the production of war materiel, optimize re-
source allocation within the military and civilian sectors,
and secure a fair distribution of goods and services between
the two sectors. At the same time, the efficiency of the
mobilization effort is degraded to the extent that, singly
or collectively, administrative waste exists, usable re-





consumer goods distribution is improperly managed, or the
system of controls breaks down. The aggregate of achieved
objectives, offset by unreconciled obstacles, results in a
mobilized economy, however, when all available manpower is
drawn into the labor force, when wartime levels of produc-
tion manhours are attained, and when all economic output in
excess of the amount set aside for the civilian sector is
.
• 122provided for military purposes.
The forced movement of the economy from a normal
peacetime condition to one of mobilization requires that a
number of independent, but related, elements be considered.
The most significant of these are: (1) the size of the
labor force, (2) the availability and allocation of re-
sources, (3) the condition of the industrial base, and (4)
economic controls. Each element must be assessed, both
within the context of current capabilities and requirements,
and those projected to be in existence when the selected
mobilization target date is reached. Based on these assess-
ments, an integrated economic mobilization plan must then be
developed and implemented.
The available labor force is assumed, for planning
purposes, to consist of all working age (officially, four-
teen years of age and older) males and females in the
12 •Tibor Scitovsky, Edward Shaw, and Lone Tarshis,




population, excluding those necessary to meet current and
projected military manning levels, as reflected in the mili-
• 123tary mobilization plan. " That portion of the population
that is either working or seeking work is termed the occu-
pied labor force, or simply, the labor force. The ratio of
the size of this force to the size of the available labor
force is the factor with which mobilization planners are
concerned. On the basis of previous U.S. mobilization ex-
perience, the size requirement of the labor force is assumed
to be approximately sixty percent of the available labor
force, although variations in the actual percentage may
124
occur. Thus, the size of the projected labor force at
any future point in time may be estimated from current cen-
sus information and projected birth and death rates.
The allocation of limited national resources— land,
labor, capital, and management--is a complex task in normal
times, and tends to become even more complicated when the
largely self -regulated free market economy of peacetime is
supplanted by the strict government controls associated with
mobilization. Opposing this tendency, however, is an in-
creased degree of government freedom in effecting direct al-
terations to the operation of the economy. Not only do gov-
ernment agencies determine which industries will receive




priority in the allocation of resources, but they also di-
rectly or indirectly regulate the amount of resources that
will flow to the various industries, the types of goods and
services to be produced, production levels, and the distri-




. 125tween the military and civilian sectors.
The aim of mobilization is to provide the maximum
level of war-related goods and services to the military
sector. In microeconomic terms, this involves the altera-
tion of the consumption frontier or the expansion of pro-
duction in war industries. In addition to a shift in con-
sumption patterns away from consumer goods, this may be
achieved through technological advances that result in in-
creased productivity, and through increases in the availa-
bility of the factors of production (i.e., resources) re-
quired by the key industries. Six principal means exist for
providing additional resources for mobilization: (1) through
increased production, achieved by increasing the size of the
labor force, inducing people to work longer hours, and in-
creasing efficiency; (2) by foregoing investment in new
forms of capital equipment not essential for war purposes;
(3) by utilizing the full amount of existing capital; (4) by
reducing personal consumption; (5) through loans and gifts
125Classroom lecture presented by Dr. George R. Feiwel,
guest professor, at the Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey,
California, 8 December 1982.
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from abroad; and (6) through the production of goods in con-
L 26quered nations.
The third facet of economic mobilization to be con-
sidered is the strength and structure of the industrial
base. The key issue here is the productive potential of the
economy. It is to be expected that, prior to mobilization,
the nation's industrial productivity will be at some level
below its full potential. Thus, the problem becomes one not
only of shifting from the production of consumer goods to
the production of war materiel, but also one of increasing
industrial output to a level approaching the productive po-
tential of the nation. Three mechanisms for stimulating the
growth of industrial plant capacity exist, in addition to
those noted above. The first is the certificate of tax
amortization. This allows a firm an accelerated write-off
on that portion of its plant and equipment considered neces-
sary to the mobilization effort, with the result that expan-
sion or conversion is effectively subsidized by public reve-
nues. The second consists of long-term government loans,
normally provided to firms to increase their capacity to
produce goods that are required for the war effort, but are
also transferable to a normal peacetime economy. Finally,
12'






The final component of the economic policy during
mobilization is that of controls. Controls serve the pur-
pose of establishing the framework for and regulating the
operation of the mobilization economy. Typical controls in-
clude those placed on allocations and priorities (i.e., the
control of resources), output, distribution, prices, wages,




Two additonal, unplanned--and undesired--economic
aspects of mobilization remain to be discussed. These are
the problems of the black market and inflation.
The reduction in the types and guantities of availa-
ble consumer goods associated with the shifting of produc-
tion toward the military sector, and price controls or ra-
tioning--or both--will result, to a greater or lesser de-
gree, in the formation of a black market. This illegal mar-
ket place responds to the resistence of consumers to a re-
duction in their standard of living and to their willingness
to pay higher prices in order to possess products they could
not normally purchase. Although the interests of both the
buyer and the seller are served, the nation is adversely
effected by the operation of the black market, in that goods
.
. 129
and capital are diverted from the legitimate economy.
i no
Seymour E. Harris, The Economics of Mobilization and
Inflation (New York: W. W. Norton, 1951), pp. 197-230.
129Albert G. Hart, Defense Without Inflation (New York:
Twentieth Century Fund, 1951), pp. 87-88.
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Inflation occurs when there is a ". . . general ex-
cess of aggregate demand for goods and services over aggre-
130 . .gate supply at current prices." Conditions conducive to
such occurrence are characteristic of a mobilization period,
when the number and volume of consumer goods and services
are reduced, while, at the same time, more people are work-
ing longer hours at higher pay, and thus possess greater
than normal purchasing power. A number of methods exist for
controlling inflation. Price and wage controls are direct
methods that seek to stabilize conditions by fiat. Indirect
methods attempt to resolve the conflict between the require-
ment that production be increased and the requirement that
demand be restrained. Included among these are: (1) reduc-
ing demand through the elimination .of non-essential govern-
ment expenditures, (2) increasing taxes in order to reduce
excess consumer purchasing power, (3) reducing consumer de-
mand for goods and services by promoting a program of volun-
tary saving, and (4) implementing monetary and credit poli-
cies designed to restrict the expansion of bank credit and
131the money supply. One or more of these direct and indi-
rect methods may be utilized. The type and extent of infla-
tion controls employed will depend on existing conditions.
Campbell, pp. 69-70.
''"Lester V. Chandler and Donald H. Wallace, Economic




3 . Political Aspects of Mobilization
Mobilization, is an act of political will, involving
a conscious decision by the President and supported by the
132Congress and the American people. The complexity of the
mobilization process, the nature of its impact of the econo-
my and the American public, and the seriousness of the cir-
cumstances necessitating it make the decision to mobilize
one that is not taken lightly. Historically, the United
States has tended not to prepare adequately during peacetime
133for the eventual necessity to mobilize, and has, more-
over, undertaken mobilization only after the commencement of
hostilities, or when the entry of the United States into war
was imminent. For example, the nation has mobilized only
three times in this century--f ull mobilizations during the
First and Second World Wars, and partial mobilization during
the Korean War. In each instance, official mobilization
policies were initiated in response to the belligerent ac-
134 . . .tions of other nations. Prior to each of these decisions
132 Foster and Hoeber, p. 448.
Gansler, The Defense Industry
, p. 109.
L34 . .
It may be argued that the U.S. mobilization process
for World War II was initiated by President Roosevelt as
early as 1939, through a series of executive actions designed
to bolster the nation's war production capabilities, raise
the level of preparedness of the armed forces, and aid the
future European allies. An officially declared mobilization
program was not implemented, however, until the U.S. entered




to mobilize, no responsible organization existed to coordi-
nate all aspects of the effort, and, although general mobi-
lization plans existed, formal legislative and executive
action was necessary—often on an ad hoc basis--to execute
the specific initiatives of the mobilization effort.
The inherent deficiencies associated with this type
of stimulus-response approach to mobilization was recog-
nized, and, following World War II, a national-level effort
was undertaken to establish and maintain a peacetime mobili-
. .
. . 135
zation capability m-being. This effort, drawing upon
the experiences of World War II and responding, in part, to
the requirements of the Korean War, was implemented through
several statutory mechanisms. The first of these was the
Strategic and Critical Materials Stock Piling Act "of 1946.
This act, reflecting the beliefs of General George C.
135 ....
A similar realization had occurred at the conclusion
of World War I. During the closing days of the war, and
continuing during the interwar years, a number of initia-
tives were undertaken in an effort to provide for national
defense preparedness and for the maintenance of a peacetime
capability to mobilize in the event of war (e.g., the Na-
tional Defense Act of 1920, providing for industry and mili-
tary collaboration on procurement and economic planning for
future wars; the Army-Navy Munitions Board, 1922; the Army
Industrial College, 1924; the Industrial Mobilization Plan
of 1930, providing for a War Resources Administration; the
War Policies Commission, 1930; the National Recovery Admin-
istration, 1933; and the Protective Mobilization Plan, de-
veloped between 1936 and 1939). The histories of these pro-
grams and the events of World War II, relating to mobiliza-
tion, indicate that these interwar organizations and prepa-
rations were not altogether successful in achieving their
purposes. See Paul A. C. Koistinen, The Military-Industrial
Complex: A Historical Perspective , with a Foreword by Con-
gressman Les Aspin (New York: Praeger, 1980).
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Marshall and certain key Truman Administration officials,
recognized the dependence of the United States on foreign
sources of raw materials required for defense-related indus-
trial production, and was designed to ease this condition
and support the creation and maintenance of a broad mobili-
zation base through the accumulation of raw materials rather
than military end-items. Driven by postwar domestic pres-
sures for reductions in government expenditures, the act
provided two major benefits within the administration's pro-
gram of maintaining a state of mobilization preparedness in
lieu of forces in-being. First, it provided increased
economy in the defense area through the deletion of certain
requirements for the stockpiling of war reserve material
having the potential of being obsolete when its use became
necessary in wartime. And, second, taken together with sepa-
rate provisions for additional production facilities, it made
available the raw materials necessary to support the rapid
. . . . 137
expansion of military production in the event of war.
The second statutory mechanism was the National Se-
curity Act of 1947. This act created the National Security
Resources Board, responsible for advising "... the Presi-
dent regarding the co-ordination of military, industrial,
and civilian mobilization," and "... was to provide the
1 n r





machinery through which manpower/ resources, and productive
potential could be geared to support foreign and military
1 38 • • . ...policy. " Additionally, it provided indirect support for
mobilization by establishing the National Security Council
(NSC), tasked with the responsibility for coordinating do-
mestic, economic, foreign, and military policies in support
of national security.
The Defense Production Act of 1950 was the third,
and final, major statutory mechanism implemented during the
post-World War II period. This act provided for the inte-
gration of national economic and defense policies and ob-
jectives in order to guarantee that the nation's capability
to successfully respond to emergency conditions was achieved
and maintained. The primary impetus for the enactment of
the Defense Production Act (DPA) came from the necessity to
expand the production capabilities of American industry to
support the mobilization effort and combat operations of the
Korean War. Several additional domestic and international
conditions and events, occurring in the immediate post-World
War II years, also influenced its development. First, bow-
ing to domestic pressures, the United States had implemented
a drastic demobilization program in the aftermath of the
war. During the three-year period from mid-1945 to mid-1948,
1 TO
John C. Ries, The Management of Defense: Organiza -
tion and Control of the U.S. Armed Services (Baltimore:
Johns Hopkins Press, 1964), pp. 93-94.
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this program resulted in the reduction of military personnel
levels from slightly more than twelve million to roughly one
and one-half million, the disposal of surplus property val-
ued at nearly $50 billion, the disposal or deactivation of
some 1,300 government-owned industrial plants and facili-
ties, the termination of the Lend-Lease Program, and the
termination of outstanding government procurement contracts
139totalling approximately $62 billion. Second, by mid-
1948, the realities of the Cold War, combined with expanding
U.S. international economic and military commitments, had
emphasized the necessity for increased domestic industrial
plant capability. And, third, an awareness was growing at
the top level of the government leadership of the need for
increased industrial preparedness in support of national
security. This awareness was clearly reflected in National
Security Council Memorandum 68 (NSC-68), issued for limited
distribution in April 1950. As a comprehensive statement of
national strategy, this document presented a "balance be-
. tween economic and military programs and among the various
.
. 140
military needs," and included among its stated require-
ments for achieving national aims, that the "United States
. . . maximize our economic potential, including the
strengthening of our peacetime economy and the establishment
139U.S., Library of Congress, United States Defense





or essential reserves readily available in the event of
„ 141
war.
4. The Utility of Mobilization
The introduction of nuclear weapons into the politi-
cal-military equation has further complicated the already
complex mobilization process. Within the context of the
post-World War II world, the impact of nuclear weapons on
mobilization may be viewed as having taken two basic forms.
First, whereas the fighting of a conventional war requires
the concentration of forces and support for the projection
of national power against an enemy, the nature of nuclear
war necessitates the dispersal of forces and industrial cen-
ters in order to reduce the presentation of high-value tar-
142gets to the effects of an enemy's weapons. And, second,
nuclear war has been seen as being of short duration, thus,
obviating the relevance of a traditional, protracted mobili-
zation effort undertaken after the commencement of hostili-
ties, and increasing the importance of pre-war preparations
143
to create a credible deterrent posture.
Recent changes in United States strategic nuclear
doctrine, promulgated in Presidential Directive 59 (PD-59),
141
"NSC-68: A Report to the National Security Council,"
Naval War College Review , 1975, p. 106.
142Foster and Hoeber, p. 442.
143Hitch and McKean, pp. 312-320.
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on July 25, 1980, however, have generated a reexamination of
the role of mobilization in support of national objectives
in a nuclear war environment. This doctrine, designed to
enhance the credibility of the U.S. deterrent posture, rec-
ognizes an existing Soviet nuclear war-fighting and war-
winning strategy, provides policy guidance for the develop-
ment of an offsetting U.S. counterforce nuclear targeting
capability, and calls for the development of a secure nucle-
ar and conventional reserve force capable of withstanding an
initial Soviet counterforce nuclear strike in order to be
available as an "assured destruction" deterrent to a Soviet
attack on American cities. Implicit in PD-59 is acknowledg-
ment of the potential for a prolonged nuclear war and the
possibility of a nuclear cease-fire, while conventional hos-
. . . . 144 . .tilities continue. Within this context, the benefits
derived from mobilization--particularly , its inherent flexi-
bility of implementation and those benefits associated with
the bolstering of the U.S. deterrent posture--assume a much
greater importance.
144
roster and Hoeber, p. 441.
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UNITED STATES MOBILIZATION POTENTIAL
The growing confluence between the strategy of mobiliza-
tion and the strategy of deterrence is reflected in the fol-
lowing statement contained in Secretary of Defense Caspar W.
Weinberger's most recent Annual Report to the Congress :
The capability of the United States to mobilize its
vast economic, industrial, and human resources to aug-
ment the active forces in times of national emergency
is an essential factor in deterring potential enemies
and reassuring U.S. allies . The deterrent value of
mobilization resides not only in the military compo-
nents but also in the convertibility of civilian man-
power and production capabilities into military units
and industrial warfighting support. (Emphasis added.)
. . . Improving our capabilities to respond mili-
tarily to various emergencies is largely a planning
activity. . . . The small commitment of resources
reguired for these activities has a potentially larger
payoff in preparedness should actual mobilization be
required . 1^5
The Annual Report continues by describing the various ini-
tiatives available to support mobilization, but unaddressed
are considerations of the viability of the existing organi-
zational infrastructure for mobilization, the current status
of U.S. mobilization capabilities, and the ability of the
nation to meet its stated mobilization ob jectives--that is,
the ability to match means (resources and capabilities) with
ends (goals). Nor do these considerations receive more than
145U.S., Department of Defense, Annual Report to the




cursory addressal in the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) mili-
tary posture statement for fiscal year 1984, although it
also notes the importance of mobilization to the national
146
security. Recently, nowever, growing concern within the
military committees of the Congress and within a limited
sector of the American public regarding the capability of
the United States to mobilize its potential effectively
have emphasized these considerations and the need for cor-
rective action, as a matter of national priority, in defi-
cient areas.
A. ORGANIZATIONAL INFRASTRUCTURE
1 . National Security, the President and Congress
The framers of the Constitution were deeply con-
cerned with the guestion of where authority should reside
in the republican form of government they were creating.
147The ensuing debate was centered on considerations of
whether the national government should be stronger or weaker
than the governments of the various states of the Union, and
which branch of the federal government—executive
,
judiciary
146U.S., Joint Chiefs of Staff, United States Military
Posture for FY 1984
, pp. 36-38.
147The primary medium of the debate was a series of 85
essays written by Alexander Hamilton, James Madison, and
John Jay, and published as The Federalist between 1787 and
1788. See Charles A. Beard, The Enduring Federalist (Garden
City, NY: Doubleday & Co . , 1948); John Spencer Basset, The
Federalist System (Mew York: Greenwood Press, 1906); and




or legislative--should dominate in control of the govern-
ment .
The government structure eventually incluaed in the
Constitution envisioned both a balancing of power between
the national and state governments, and a distribution of
authority and responsibility among the branches of the na-
tional government. The principal representatives of the
people, the President and the members of the Congress, were
148to be popularly elected, and the Congress was to consist
of two chambers, the Senate, in which each state was to
have equal representation, and the House of Representatives,
in which the states would be represented on the basis of
their populations. Further, the concept of a "division of
labor and separation of control" (commonly referred to as a
system of "checks and balances"), borrowed from the theories
149
of Montesquieu and Locke, was embodied in the assignment
of specific areas of responsibility and authority to the
three branches of government. In the purist view, the re-
sultant balance of power and division of labor within the
government consisted of provisions for a legislative branch
to enact public laws, an executive branch to implement the
laws, and a judiciary to interpret them, with each branch
148 • . . •Originally, the Constitution called for senators to
be elected by the state legislatures. The Seventeenth





having specific, statutory balancing powers with regard lo
the other branches (e.g., the presidential veto, congres-
sional power to override the veto, congressional oversight
authority, and judiciary review)
.
The relationships that exist between the branches of
the federal government--particularly between the Executive
and Congress--are very complex. The functional implementa-
tion of constitutional authority and responsibility has
varied considerably from the simplistic construct of a
static balance between a Congress that legislates and an
Executive that implements. The relationship is, rather,
dynamic, having evolved over time, with the location of
relative power and control of the government variously re-
siding in the Congress and the Executive (the so-called
"congressional government" and "presidential government,"
respectively), and changing with the force of personalities,
150issues, circumstances, and historical events. Nowhere is
this dynamism more pronounced than in the areas of foreign
policy and national security.
Congressional and presidential authority and respon-
sibility in the area of national security derive from the
powers enumerated in Articles I and II of the Constitution.
Article I states, in part, that
. . . the Congress shall have the power ... to pro-
vide for the common defense, ... to raise and support
150Davidson and Oleszek, pp. 207-208.
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armies, ... to provide and maintain a navy, . . .
and, to make ail laws which shall be necessary and
proper for carrying into execution the foregoing pow-
ers, and all other powers vested by this Constitution
in the Government of the United States, or in any de-
partment or officer thereof. 151
These powers, taken together with congressional authority
over the collection of revenues (i.e., taxation) and the
authorization and appropriation of revenues for government
expenditure, cast Congress in the role of provider of the
means of national security. At the same time, the Presi-
dent, as commander-in-chief of the armed forces and head of
state and government, is responsible for the development and
execution of security policy--within the bounds of the re-
sources provided by Congress. Thus, although Congress does
not have specific constitutional authority to formulate na-
tional security policy, it does have both a direct and an
indirect impact on the formulation and execution of policy
by the executive branch through its "power of the purse" and
its authority to enact "necessary and proper" legislation in
meeting its statutory responsibility "to provide for the
common defense" of the nation.
The nature and extent of congressional involvement
in the area of national security have changed significantly
over the course of the post-World War II period. Func-
tional expression of this involvement, within the broader
151 •Encyclopaedia Britannica , 1982 ed. , s.v. "Constitu-
tion of the United States [1787]."
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dynamic of the executive-congressional relationship, may be
divided into two discernible phases, generally conforming to
the major phases through which the international environment
has passed. The first phase, lasting roughly from 1947 un-
til 1967, coincided with the initial period of the Cold War.
It was characterized by a strongly bipartisan consensus in
both foreign and defense policy, derived from a clearly de-
fined perception of Communism, embodied in the Soviet Union,
as the principal threat to the security of the nation. In
matters relating to defense policy, the period was marked
by "executive dominance" of the Congress, resulting from an
executive branch monopoly over pertinent information, gener-
al public support for existing and planned defense programs,
the nature of the issues involved (e.g., classified, techni-
cal, complex, and high risk), and the decentralized decision-
making organization and domestic orientation of the Congress
itself. The Congress of this period has been termed a "rub-
ber stamp" Congress, generally content to address itself to
the structural aspects of defense policy (i.e., budget, per-
sonnel, material, and organizational decisions), and to act
as a "conduit" for the strategically-oriented (i.e., program
152 ...
and use decisions)" programs and policy initiatives of the
executive branch. Thus, during this phase, Congress tended




defense policy-making, doing so, as a general rule, only
when executive branch consensus on policy issues was clearly
lacking.
The manifestation of the second postwar phase of
congressional defense policy activity, dating from 1969,
generally corresponded to the emergence of the relatively
tranguil international period of detente. Reacting to both
international and domestic influences, a number of institu-
tional and functional changes occurred within Congress,
while, at the same time, the executive-congressional rela-
tionship underwent a transition from the congressional "ac-
commodation" and "acquiescence" of the previous period, to a
154
stance of "assertiveness" on the part of Congress. The
impetus for these alterations was derived from four primary
sources. First, within the framework of an era of interna-
tional understanding and "peaceful coexistence" between the
superpowers, public perceptions of the external threat,
prevalent during the Cold War years, decreased. Second, by
the late 1960s, American involvement in the Vietnam War had
become a major domestic issue, involving increasing public
anti-war and anti-defense sentiment, reflected in increased
public pressure to reduce defense spending and American
153 Edward J. Laurance, "The Changing Role of Congress in
Defense Policy-Making, " ournal of Conflict Resolution 20
(June 1976) :215.
Kegley and Wittkopf, pp. 396-398.
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foreign military involvement. Third, the executive branch
monopoly over defense-related information was broken, pro-
viding Congress with the opportunity to include defense
policy alternatives originating outside the executive branch
in its deliberations. And, finally, deteriorating domestic
and international economic conditions, accompanied by in-
creasingly large government budget deficits, had generated
an ongoing debate over national priorities. The result of
these diverse domestic and international influences was the
emergence of a much more circumspect Congress. Within the
defense policymaking arena, this revised attitude was re-
flected in the general repudiation of the "conduit" role of
the previous period and a growing tendency not only to ques-
tion policy alternatives presented by the executive branch,
but, in some cases, to reject them and to legislate congres-
sional alternatives on the basis of information and analyses
155provided by non-executive branch sources.
In the present, the circumspect orientation of the
Congress continues, and many of the institutional and func-
tional mechanisms that resulted in or were developed during





and consideration of a broadened spectrum of defense policy
alternatives, the influence of special interest groups, de-





budget authorization and appropriation process, and statu-
tory limitation and regulation of executive branch authori-
ty. At the same time, however, the executive-congressional
relationship, responding to changes in the international en-
vironment, has undergone an alteration since the mid-1970s,
moving in the direction of the "accommodation" of the earli-
er period. Whether the systemic changes in the internation-
al system that resulted in the modification of the relation-
ship--e.g., the breakdown of detente and the commencement of
"Cold War II," the emergence of a condition of United States
strategic parity relative to the Soviet Union, and the in-
creasing influence of Third and Fourth World nations and
multinational cartels--will also result in a movement into a
third phase of congressional defense policy involvement re-
mains to be seen. The possibility cannot, however, be dis-
counted .
2 . Mobilization Organization
The complexity involved in developing and maintain-
ing the mobilization base, the potentially greater complexi-
ty associated with an actual mobilization effort, and the
potential, far-ranging domestic impacts of peacetime prepa-
rations and wartime mobilization have resulted in the crea-
156tion of a massive "organization" to control the process.
156 ...The term "organization" is employed loosely, since no
formal organization, encompassing all mobilization partici-
pants, exists. Instead, the departments, committees,
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The executive and legislative branches share the multidimen-
sional responsibilities for mobilization. In general, the
executive branch is responsible for developing mobilization
plans and the mobilization structure, developing and main-
taining mobilization base capabilities, and executing the
mobilization process, when required. Congress, on the other
hand, provides the fiscal means and statutory framework for
mobilization, and, exercising its oversight authority, moni-
tors the preparations and, when applicable, the mobilization
effort itself.
The principal congressional and executive branch
participants in the mobilization process are displayed in
Table 20. Included are more than twenty-five congressional
committees and agencies, ten executive departments, fifteen
Department of Defense (DOD) agencies, and twenty-five non-
DOD organizations. Not included in the table, but also par-
ticipating in the process, are at least three non-govern-
mental organizations (the American Trucking Association, the
Association of American Railroads, and the Air Transport As-
sociation of America), several less significant government
organizations (e.g., the National Aeronautics and Space Ad-
ministration, the National Highway Traffic Safety Adminis-
tration, the Office of Pipeline Safety, the St. Lawrence
commissions, agencies, and offices involved in mobilization
are largely independent of each other, and their actions are







Banking, Housing and Urban Affairs
Budget
Commerce, Science and Transportation
Energy and Natural Resources
Environment and Public Works
Finance
Governmental Affairs




Banking, Finance and Urban Affairs
Budget
Education and Labor
Energy and Natural Resources
Government Operations
Interstate and Foreign Commerce
Merchant Marine and Fisheries




Congressional Budget Office (CBO)
Congressional Research Service
General Accounting Office (GAO)





Health and Human Services Transportation
Interior Treasury





Defense Communications Agency (DCA)
Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA)
Defense Investigative Service (DIS)
Defense Logistics Agency (DLA)
Defense Mapping Agency (DMA)
Defense Nuclear Agency (DNA)
Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS)
Joint Deployment Agency
Joint Material Priorities and Allocations Board
Joint Transportation Board
Military Airlift Command (MAC)
Military Sealift Command (MSC)
Military services (Army, Navy, Marines and Air Force)
Military Traffic Management Command
National Security Agency/Central Security Service
NON-DEFENSE DEPARTMENT ORGANIZATIONS





Emergency Mobilization Preparedness Board
Environmental Protection Agency (EPA)
Federal Aviation Administration (FAA)
Federal Communications Commission (FCC)
Federal Coordinating Council for Science, Engineering
and Technology
Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA)
Federal Highway Administration
Federal Railroad Administration
General Services Administration (GSA)
Interstate Commerce Commission
Maritime Administration (MARAD)
National Communications System (NCS)
National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA)
National Science Foundation
National Security Council (NSC)
Office of Defense Resources








Seaway Development Corporation, the Tennessee Valley Au-
thority, and the Urban Mass Transportation Agency), and,
within the executive departments, the myriad of separate
offices tasked with mobilization responsibilities (for ex-
157
ample, the more than fifty offices within DOD, alone).
The diffusion of responsibility within this diverse mobili-
zation "organization," its sheer size, and the necessity for
interdepartmental and executive-congressional coordination
are potential sources for the loss of efficiency in opera-
158
tion. In an attempt to reduce the influence of these
counter-productive conditions and provide "a comprehensive
. . . . 159 .
national mobilization policy," in late 1981, President
Ronald Reagan directed the establishment of the Emergency
Mobilization Preparedness Board (EMPB). This senior-level
interdepartmental organization is chaired by the President's
Assistant for National Security Affairs, and its membership
includes representatives, at the deputy secretary or under
secretary level, from twenty-two federal departments and
agencies. The primary function of the EMPB is the "coordi-
nation of mobilization planning and guidance," accomplished





U.S., Congress, House, The Ailing Defense Industrial
Base: Unready for Crisis
, p. 1.
U.S., Joint Chiefs of Staff, United States Military
Posture for FY 1984, p. 37.
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through twelve interdepartmental working groups organized
160
along runctional lines.
3 . Mobilization Legislation
Several existing public laws have a significant im-
pact upon the development and maintenance of mobilization
capabilities. These statutes provide the reguired organiza-
tional structure, guidance, authority, delineation of re-
sponsibilities, and resources to sustain the mobilization
base, and establish the legal authorities necessary for
national response during times of emergency.
a. Strategic and Critical Minerals Stockpiling Act
of 1946
Stockpiling provides ". . .a secure, reliable
and sufficient supply of strategic raw and processed miner-
als ... to help meet defense and national security needs.
161
. .
." U.S. war reserves and strategic stockpiles pro-
vided for under the Strategic and Critical Minerals Stock-
piling Act of 1946, as amended, are designed to serve this
purpose by making available to the national economy (includ-
ing both the military and civilian sectors) sufficient
guantities of necessary materials to sustain industrial
U.S., Department of Defense, Annual Report to the
ongress, Fiscal Year 1984
, p. 261.
Priscilla G. McLeroy, Thomas D. Braschayko, and W. C
J. van Rensburg, "US Resources Policy: The 1982 Report to
Congress," Resources Policy (December 1982): 249.
153

production during the transition from peacetime to wartime
(that is, from D-to-P). Current guidance requires that
stockpiled materials be capable of supporting a D-to-P peri-
od of three years' duration.
The National Defense Stockpile is controlled by
the General Services Administration (GSA). The types and
quantities of materials maintained in the stockpile are
based on the Annual Materials Plan developed by the Inter-
ICQ
agency Stockpile Goal Review Committee and approved by
the President and Congress. In addition to D-to-P consid-
erations, "... stockpile goals are based on estimates that
take into account the following factors: (1) stringent
limitations on the levels of personal consumption expendi-
tures; (2) restrictions on the proportions of consumer ex-
penditures on durable goods; (3) restrictions on the level
of residential investment; and (4) expected material substi-
tution possibilities."
1 r o
Gansler, he Defense Industry
, pp. 68-69. See also,
U.S., Library of Congress, United States Defense Policies
Since World War II
, pp. 55-56; and Alton D. Slay, "Strategic




The Interagency Stockpile Goal Review Committee is
chaired by FEMA and consists of members from the Departments
of Defense, Commerce, the Interior, Treasury, State and En-
ergy; the Office of Management and Budget; the Central Intel-
ligence Agency; the General Services Administration; and
the National Security Council.
164U.S., Congress, Senate, Committee on Armed Services,
Stockpile Legislation, Hearings before the Subcommittee on
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b. National Security Act of 1947
The National Security Act of 1947 tasked the
National Security Resources Board (following several execu-
tive branch reorganizations, now, the Federal Emergency Man-
agement Agency, FEMA) ". . .to undertake, and to advise the
165President on, mobilization planning." Currently, FEMA
has the responsibility to develop plans for:
-- industrial and civilian mobilization to make the
maximum use of the nation's manpower in time of war;
-- the stabilization and conversion to a wartime foot-
ing of the civilian economy;
-- unifying the activities of federal departments and
agencies engaged in activities important to the war
effort or mobilization;
-- rationalizing potential supplies of and reguirements
for manpower, resources and productive facilities;
-- establishing adeguate reserves of strategic and
critical materials (i.e., the National Defense
Stockpile); and





government and other essential economic activities.
FEMA is also tasked with the responsibility, indirectly re-
lated to its mobilization tasks, for civil disaster relief.
Preparedness of the Senate Committee on Armed Services on




Leon S. Reed, "Obsolescence, Decling Productivity,
and the American Defense Mobilization Infrastructure," in
The U.S. Defense Mobilization Infrastructure: Problems and
Priorities , eds. Robert L. Pfaltzgraff, Jr. and Uri Ra'anan
(Hamden, Ct . : Archon Books, 1983), p. 129.
166 Ibid., pp. 129-130.
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c. Defense Production Act of 1950
The Defense Production Act of 1950 is one of the
principal statutory mechanisms through which national econ-
omic and defense policies and objectives are integrated in
order to guarantee that the capability of the nation to suc-
cessfully respond to emergency conditions is achieved and
maintained. In its original form, the Defense Production
Act (DPA) consisted of seven titles, granting the President
diverse discretionary powers (the so-called "economic war
powers of the President" ) to ensure that national indus-
trial production capabilities were maintained to support
national defense and mobilization programs. Four of the
titles (II, IV, V and VI) expired in 1953 and -were not re-
newed . The remaining titles include both permanent and
non-permanent provisions. The non-permanent provisions have
been periodically extended, but to date, no extension has
exceeded two years in duration. Since its enactment, a
number of amendments have been made to the DPA in response
x.o changing conditions and national requirements, but the
original intent of integrating industrial preparedness with
U.S., Congress, House, Congressman Blanchard speaking
for the Amendment of the Defense Production Act of 1950,




U.S., Congress, House, Committee on Education and
Labor, Defense Industrial Base Revitalization Act , H. Rept
.




national security has been retained. In its present form,
the provisions of the DPA are as follows:
Title I provides authorization for the Defense
Priorities System, an energy priorities system and for
the management of these systems. Title III authorizes
the President to guarantee loans and to take other fi-
nancial measures necessary to expand productive capaci-
ty and supply in the interest of national defense. Ti-
tle VII prohibits discrimination against small business
firms in achieving the objectives of the DPA, provides
for the National Defense Executive Reserve, establishes
other authorities regarding personnel carrying out pro-
grams under the Act and provides for oversight of the
programs under the Act. The permanent provisions of
Title VII authorize the promulgation of cost accounting
standards to cover government contractors and permit
the President to grant antitrust immunity to firms
entering into voluntary agreements for industrial de-
fense purposes at the reguest of the President . 1^9
d. Emergency Legal Authorities
A number of legal authorities exist, granting
conditional powers and authority to the President and other
key government officials. These authorities are based on
U.S. Codes and Public Law, Executive Orders issued by the
President, federal and departmental regulations, and inter-
agency agreements. They "... authorize Federal officials
to take certain actions during times of war, national emer-
gency, or other circumstances deemed sufficiently critical
to warrant the exercise of such extraordinary authority."
169U.S., Congress, Senate, Committee on Banking, Housing
and Urban Affairs, Defense Production Act Extension of 1982 ,
S. Rept. 412 to Accompany S. 2375, 97th Cong., 2nd sess.,
1982, p. 3.






Existing emergency authorities fall into three
categories/ having progressively wider ranges of power and
scopes of impact on the mobilization process. The first
group, summarized in Table 21, provides limited authorities
in peacetime and do not reguire the declaration of a nation-
al emergency. Second are those authorities, providing a
wider range of powers, which reguire a declaration of na-
tional emergency by the President. These are summarized in
Table 22. The final group of emergency authorities, sum-
marized in Table 23, are those that provide the greatest
range of emergency powers, but reguire a congressional dec-
laration of national emergency before they may be imple-
mented .
The declaration of a national emergency does
not carry with it the automatic approval of the authorities
contained in Tables 22 and 23. When the President declares
an emergency, he must identify which authorities he intends
to invoke. He may, however, invoke additional authorities
through subseguent declarations of intent. Although not
specifically reguired, current DOD guidance calls for simi-
lar procedures to be followed in the case of an emergency
declared by the Congress--that is, necessary authorities are
to be identified to the President for presentation to Con-
A 1 4-' * 4. 4. 171gress m a declaration of intent.
171 T,., . .Ibid
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Reservists









10 USC 712 Detail of members of armed



























Army Surgeon General with
SecArmy or SecAir Force
approval may employ as
many contract surgeons as
may be necessary
Coast Guard to operate as
a service of the Navy
Recall of retired Coast
Guard enlisted members
Detention of armed vessels





(need not be for-
mally declared)
Any war and U.S.
is neutral




TABLE 21. POWERS AVAILABLE DURING AN EMERGENCY WHICH DO NOT
REQUIRE A FORMAL DECLARATION OF NATIONAL EMERGENCY
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>naA o+- rateqic materials
Place mandatory orders for
prompt delivery of material















TABLE 21 (Cont'd). POWERS AVAILABLE DURING AN EMERGENCY
WHICH DO NOT REQUIRE A FORMAL DECLARATION
OF NATIONAL EMERGENCY
[Source: U.S., Department of Defense, Master Mobilization
Plan (MMP) (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office,
1982)





10 USC 673 Order up to one million members of the
Ready Reserve to active duty for not more
than 24 months
10 USC 679(d) Extension of Reserve active duty agreement
without consent of reservist
10 USC 2304 Exemption of certain purchases and con-
(a)(1), (2)/ tracts from formal advertising reguirements
(16)
10 USC 7224 Gives SecNav authority to designate persons
to be carried on naval vessels at government
expense
10 USC 8313 Retention and promotion of regular officers
14 USC 367 Extension of Coast Guard enlisted personnel
(a)(4)
42 USC 217 Use of Public Health Service commissioned
corps as a branch of the land or naval forces
46 USC 835 Restrictions on the transfer of shipping
facilities
46 USC 1241 Waiver of reguirement to ship 50% on pri-
(b)(1) vately owned U.S. flag vessels
46 USC 1242 Authority to reguisition or purchase, or to
(a) charter or reguisition the use thereof,
ships owned by U.S. citizens
50 USC 98- Release of stockpiled strategic and critical
98h, 98h-l materials
50 USC 191 Authority to control ocean-going vessels in
U.S. waters
50 USC 196- Authority to seize non-U. S. owned vessels
198 lying idle in U.S. waters
50 USC 1431- Exemption of national defense contracts from
1435 certain statutory limitations









Suspension of restrictions on chemical and
biological agents
Use of ships in the NDRF
50 USC 1641 President and executive agencies must
maintain index and file of significant
Presidential orders issued under the
declaration of national emergency.
TABLE 22 (Cont ' d)
.
POWERS GAINED UNDER A PRESIDENTIAL
DECLARATION OF NATIONAL EMERGENCY
Master Mobilization[Source: U.S., Department of Defense,
Plan (MMP) (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office,
1982)





10 USC 511(a) Extension of terms of enlistment for
reserve components
10 USC 511(c) Extension of term of service of an enlisted
member transferred to a reserve component
10 USC 519 Extension of temporary enlistments in an
armed force
10 USC 672(a) Authority to order any member of unit of a
reserve component to active duty for the
duration plus 6 months
10 USC 674 Authority to order members and units of the
Standby Reserve to active duty
10 USC 675 Authority to order a qualified member of
the Retired Reserve to active duty
10 USC 5402 Suspension of ceilings for Regular Marine
(a) Corps
10 USC 5402 Suspension of ceilings for Regular Marine
(b)
m
Corps in enlisted members
(
10 USC 6485 Order Fleet Reserve or Fleet Marine Reserve
(a) members to active duty for duration plus 6
months
32 USC 302 Extension of National Guard enlistments for
the duration plus 6 months
TABLE 23. POWERS GAINED BY CONGRESSIONAL DECLARATION OF
EMERGENCY AND NOT AVAILABLE BY PRESIDENTIAL
DECLARATION
[Source: U.S., Department of Defense, Master Mobilization




E. CURRENT CAPABILITIES AND PROBLEMS: THE DEFENSE
INDUSTRIAL BASE
The defense industrial base represents one of the key
components of national defense and is essential to the main-
enance of a viable mobilization capability. Historically,
the industrial strength of the United States has been the
primary basis of national strength and vitality, providing
material support for national defense during peacetime and,
with the commencement of hostilities, the means for the
successful prosecution of war. In recent years, however,
the viability of the U.S. defense industrial base has become
a matter of national concern.
Congressional realization of and concern regarding the
deteriorated condition of American industry, in general, and
the capability of the defense industrial base to adeguately
support short- and long-term national defense preparedness
goals, in particular, prompted a series of congressional
hearings during 1980 and 1981, dealing with the various
functional areas of the Defense Production Act of 1950 and
related topics. The hearings conducted by the Defense In-
dustrial Base Panel of the House Armed Services Committee
between September 17 and December 3, 1980, were possibly the
most significant, "representing the first comprehensive exam-
ination of the U.S. defense industrial base since a similar
172
study by the Paley Commission in 1952.
172Howard Rush and William Page, "Long-Term Metals Fore-




At the conclusion of its hearings, the Defense Indus-
trial Base Panel reported six major finding regarding the
condition of the defense industrial base. The first of
these was that "the general condition of the defense indus-
trial base has deteriorated and is in danger of further de-
173terioration. " Several causal factors, supporting this
finding, were identified. First, the industrial base was
found to be unbalanced, having necessary capability and
capacity for production at the prime contractor level, but
significant deficiencies among small subcontractors, many of
174
whom were sole source suppliers for some products. Sec-
ond, although normal reguirements could be met by the indus-
trial base, no industrial production surge capability exist-
ed, nor had adguate planning for production surge reguire-
175 . ...
ments been undertaken. Third, significant increases were
seen in military eguipment procurement lead times as a re-
sult of reduced capabilities and serious "bottlenecks," par-
ticularly with regard to forging and casting facilities
(e.g., in 1979, the lead time for large forgings was 78 to
89 weeks for aluminum or steel and 99 to 105 weeks for
173 . .U.S., Congress, House, The Ailing Defense Industrial
Base: Unready for Crisis
, p. 1.
174Gansler, he Defense Industry , p. 130.
175
Ibid., p. 10. See also, Bruce E. Arlmghaus, "Con-
clusions," in Industrial Capacity and Defense Planning:
Sustained Conflict and Surge Capability in the 1980s , eds.
Lee D. Olvey, Henry A. Leonard, and Bruce E. Arlinghaus
(Lexington, Ma.: Lexington Books, 1983), p. 145.
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titanium, and for large castings, 46 to 62 weeks).
Fourth, shortages in skilled manpower were found to exist
(e.g., engineers, machinists, and computer operators and
maintenance personnel) and were expected to continue.
Fifth, the U.S. was found to be increasingly dependent on
foreign sources for critical raw materials and certain mili-
1 TO
tary eguipment components. Sixth, it was found that the
manufacturing productivity growth rate of the United States
was last among the world's industrialized nations, and that
the defense manufacturing sector had the lowest growth rate
179
of all domestic sectors. And, finally, inflation, exist-
ing tax policies, and decreases in the government's defense
procurement and research and development (R&D) budget had
resulted in decreased private investment in industry and,
thus, a general failure to modernize the nation's production
plant
.
176Gansler, The Defense Industry
, p. 66.
177
Ibid., p. 123. See also, Lee D. Olvey, Henry A.
Leonard, and Bruce E. Arlinghaus, eds
.
, Industrial Capacity
and Defense Planning; Sustained Conflict and Surge Capa -




Gansler, The Defense Industry
, pp. 63 and 70. See
also, Olvey, Leonard, and Arlinghaus, p. xii.
179 . .U.S., Congress, House, The Ailing Defense Industrial
3ase: Unready for Crisis
, pp. 11-17.
180
Olvey, Leonard, and Arlinghaus, p. 145.
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The second major finding was that "the Department of
Defense has neither an on-going program nor an adequate plan
to address the defense industrial base preparedness issue;
Department of Defense inaction in enhancing industrial base
preparedness . . . has contributed to the deterioration of
the U.S. defense industrial base, and as a consequence,
1 01jeopardizes the national security." Specifically, the
Panel found that the Defense Department's planning was in-
adequate, and that currently existing plans, particularly
the Five-Year Defense Plan and the Consolidated Guidance were
18?
unstable and did not address industrial preparedness.
The Panel's third finding was that "a shortage of
critical materials, combined with a resulting dependence on
uncertain foreign sources for these materials, is eroding
100
the foundation of U.S. defense capabilities." Supporting
this finding were five noted deficiencies. First, the U.S.
was found to be "more than 50% dependent on imports for 23
of the 40 most essential nonfuel minerals," and "almost to-
tally import dependent for 12 of the most critical of
184 . . ...these," making it vulnerable to the disruption of its
181
U.S., Congress, House, The Ailing Defense Industrial
Base; Unready for Crisis
, p. 1.
Ibid







strategic and critical minerals supplies. Second, the Panel
found that despite the enactment of the National Materials
and Minerals Policy Research and Development Act of 1980/
no comprehensive national materials policy or effective na-
1 Q C
tional non-fuel minerals policy existed. Third, effec-
tive planning in the area of minerals policy was found to
be hindered by a lack of information relating to the extent
of the nation's potential mineral resources. Fourth, it
was found that legislative and regulatory restrictions on
the minerals industry had resulted in a failure to explore
I Q —j
for and prove and process certain mineral resources.
And, fifth, the strategic and critical materials stockpile
was found to be inadeguate and poorly managed, containing
unnecessary items and lacking full guotas of some crucial
188
materials. In summing up this third major finding, the
Panel additionally noted that the Defense Production Act of
1950 provides a currently instituted body of authorities
. . , . . 189
capable of correcting many of the identified deficiencies.
1 O C
U.S., Congress, House, The Ailing Defense Industrial
Base; Unready for Crisis
, pp. 25-26.
1 R 6Calaway and van Rensburg, pp. 98-99.
1 R ~1




McLeroy, Braschayko, and van Rensburg, p. 249.
189 . .U.S., Congress, House, he Ailing Defense Industrial
Base; Unready for Crisis, p. 30.
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The fourth major finding was that "present policies
and procedures for the procurement of property and services
by the Department of Defense are excessively inflexible and
discourage the use of contract types that would promote the
best interests of the United States." Existing procurement
policies were seen as prohibiting assurances of stable de-
mand levels no producers and contractors, and, in this re-
gard, the Panel recommended that revised policies be adopted
allowing for advance procurement and multiyear defense con-
190tracts
.
The fifth finding of the Panel was that "current tax
and profit policies appear to discourage capital investment
in new facilities and equipment that would increase produc-
tivity and improve the condition of the defense industrial
,,191case . "
The final major finding addressed the questions of
organization and control, staring that
. . . while the condition of the defense industrial
base is of vital importance to the national defense
and security of the United States, responsibility for
the condition of the base is dispersed among the com-
mittees of Congress and within the Executive Branch.
This diffusion of responsibility has contributed to a
lack of effective long range planning for industrial
responsiveness. It has also made it extremely diffi-
cult to assess the overall effects of executive and
1 q9
congressional action on the defense industrial base.
190 Ibid., pp. 31-41.
191 Ibid., pp. 42-47.
192 Ibid., pp. 48-49.
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Subsequent to the issuance of the Defense Industrial
Base Panel report, several actions have been taken in an
effort to improve the condition of the defense industrial
base and upgrade mobilization preparedness. First, as pre-
viously noted, the Emergency Mobilization Preparedness
Board was established in 1981 as the coordinating agency for
mobilization planning and guidance. Second, a Master Mobi-
lization Plan (MMP) was promulgated by the Secretary of
Defense in June 1982. Third, Public Law 97-336, signed in
1982, established the Commission on Strategic and Critical
Materials Stockpiling Needs and the White House Conference
on Productivity. And, fourth, a number of bills and amend-
ments to the Defense Production Act of 1950, addressing the
revitalization of the defense industrial base and related




This study has sought to identify and analyze the deter-
minants of United States national potential, and to demon-
strate the relationship existing between these factors and
mobilization and between the nation's mobilization poten-
tial and United States strategic policy. Extant conditions
occurring within the domestic and international contexts and
having an influence upon the realization of national poten-
tial were assessed, as was the utility of mobilization as an
instrument of policy in balancing potential capabilities
against threats to national security within the context of
international conflict. And, finally, the U.S. mobilization
infrastructure was reviewed and existing deficiencies in
current and potential mobilization capabilities were ana-
lyzed .
On the basis of the information presented and the analy-
sis conducted in the course of this effort, three principal
conclusions were developed relating to national security and
the utilization of the mobilization process in support of
United States strategic policy. First, the United States
is increasingly vulnerable to the effects of actions taken
by other international actors, particularly the Soviet
Union. Second, mobilization, as an instrument of strategic
policy, presents a means, employable with other national
171

level initiatives from the areas of diplomacy, economics,
and ideology, z.o reduce U.S. vulnerability to external in-
fluences. And, third, although the United States possesses
significant national potential, capable of maintaining a
dual strategy of mobilization and deterrence, this potential
is neither adeguately nor sufficiently utilized in support
of national security objectives.
A. SUMMARY OF CONCLUSIONS AND SUPPORTING FACTORS
1 . United States Vulnerability
The gradual deterioration of the United States'
military, economic, industrial, and diplomatic strength
since World War II has made the nation more vulnerable to
the effects of external forces. Contributing to this dete-
rioration are the following long-term and transitory condi-
tions :
a. The erosion of national resolve and confidence;
b. A degraded domestic economy;
c. Burgeoning federal budget deficits and national
debt;
d. The emergence of the Soviet Union in a position
of nuclear force parity and conventional force superiority
relative to the United States;
e. Declining domestic industrial production levels,
financial difficulties in key industries, and the deteriora-
tion of the U.S. defense industrial base;
172

f. Increasing import dependence, particularly with
regard to supplies of strategic and critical minerals from
foreign sources, and the reduction in the U.S. share of for-
eign and domestic markets;
g. The reduced cohesion and commonality of purpose
within the Western Alliance? and
h. The fragmentation of the international arena and
the diffusion of U.S. diplomatic influence.
2 . Mobilization as a Strategic Instrument
Mobilization represents an instrument of significant
importance in United States strategic policy. When sup-
ported by a viable and secure mobilization base and compre-
hensive and realistic mobilization plans, the inherent
flexibility of the mobilization process provides a means of
maximizing potential national strength, thus increasing the
nation's freedom of activity, broadening its range of
available options, increasing its resistivity to the adverse
effects of external influences, and supporting the achieve-
ment of essential national security goals.
A mobilization effort does not, however, stand
alone. It is only one of many possible courses of action
available to the national leadership. It is compatible
with the strategy of deterrence and with other implements of
national strategy from the realms of diplomacy, economics,
and ideology. These may be employed in lieu of, and, in
173

some instances, may serve equally as well as mobilization.
When these means are utilized in conjunction with mobiliza-
tion, however, they tend to be mutually supporting, yielding
a strengthened strategic program.
3 . Actualization of Potential
The mobilization process constitutes a viable means
of providing insurance for national security through the
translation of national potential into strength in-being.
Currently, however, the following conditions detract from
the realization of this potential:
a. The vulnerability of the United States to dis-
ruptions of supplies of strategic and critical minerals from
foreign sources;
b. The degraded condition of the U.S. defense in-
dustrial base;
c. The diffusion of responsibility within the mobi-
lization infrastructure; and
d. The lack of comprehensive, integrated mobiliza-
tion contingency plans.
B. ADDITIONAL AREAS REQUIRING RESEARCH
The following mobilization related topics have been
identified as warranting additional research and considera-
tion:
1. The utility and advisability of a mobilization con-
dition (MOBCON) system, similar to the existing defense
174

condition (DEFCON) system, in which mobilization actions
would be pre-designated for employment in response to
changes in the level of international tensions;
2. A detailed cross-impact analysis of industrial mobi'
lization, considering reguirements for the factors of pro-
duction, the availability and accessibility of these fac-
tors, and the degree of disruption to the civilian sector
of industry;
3. The potential impact of deep seabed mining opera-
tions on the mobilization process; and
4. The pertinence and advisability of a comprehensive
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